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FIGHTING INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND ITS FINANCING: THE
IMPORTANCE OF FOLLOWING A COHERENT GLOBAL
STRATEGY BASED ON THE RULE OF LAW
HERBERT V. MORALS*

One of the starkest contrasts in our world today is the gulf that
exists between the civil and the uncivil. By civil I mean civilization: the accumulated centuries of learning that form our foundation for progress. By civil I also mean tolerance: the pluralism
and respect with which we accept and draw strength from the
world's diverse peoples. And finally I mean civil society: the citizens, groups, businesses, unions, professors, journalists, political
parties and others who have an essential role to play in the running of any society. Arrayed against these constructive forces,
however, in ever greater numbers and with ever stronger weapons, are the forces of what I call uncivil society. They are terrorists, criminals, drug dealers, traffickers in people, and others
who undo the good works of civil society. They take advantage of
the open borders, free markets and technological advances that
bring so many benefits to the world's people. They thrive in
countries with weak laws and institutions. And they show no scruple about resorting to intimidation or violence. Their ruthlessness is the very antithesis of all we regard as civil. They are
powerful, representing entrenched interests and the clout of a
global enterprise worth billions of dollars. But they are not
invincible.'
-Kofi Annan, Secretary-Generalof the United Nations, December 2000.

W

HILE the overarching theme of this Symposium is "U.S. Responses
to the Rise in International Crime," my Article addresses the narrower issue of "Combating the Financing of International Crime." At the
outset, I would like to make the point that it is difficult to discuss measures
to combat the financing of international crime in isolation, that is, without
* LL.B., University of Singapore; LL.M., S.J.D., Harvard. Formerly Partner
and Head of the International Legislative Reform Practice Group, Dewey
Ballantine LLP; Assistant General Counsel, International Monetary Fund; Chief
Counsel, The World Bank; and Assistant General Counsel, Asian Development
Bank. The author is currently working as an international legal consultant to
foreign governments and international organizations in the area of legal reform,
particularly in anti-money laundering and governance, and also advises on
international law issues. This Article reflects the personal views of the author.
1. Kofi Annan, Address at the Opening of the Signing Conference for the
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Dec. 12,
2000), available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speech-2000-12-12_1.html.
(583)
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at the same time addressing some of the underlying issues related to combating the primary crimes being financed. It is important to remember
that the larger war is to eliminate or reduce the commission of the primary crimes, while one of the battles of that war is to disrupt the channels
of financing for such crimes. Therefore, this Article will address the topic
of combating the financing of international crime in this broader context.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The term "international crime" is generally used to refer to all crime
that crosses international borders, for example, through the occurrence of
criminal activity in more than one jurisdiction or because the criminal or
the proceeds of the crime have moved from one jurisdiction to another.
The term is also used to describe crimes against international law, that is,
conduct that has been criminalized under an international treaty, convention or customary international law.
A half century ago, the term "international crime" was understood to
include a very limited category of crimes, such as piracy on the high seas,
smuggling, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. It is a sorry
testament to the state of affairs in the world today that the term now encompasses a much wider range of international crimes such as drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, 2 the financing of terrorism,
corruption, trafficking in women and children, tax evasion and cyber
crime. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. injected a
frightening new dimension into the realm of international crime, thereby
bringing a new sense of urgency to the war against international crime,
especially international terrorism, money laundering and the financing of
terrorism.3 Scholars, inquiry commissions and law enforcement officials
have undertaken various investigations and analyses as to how and why
such a horrendous act of terrorism could be perpetrated against innocent
4
civilians and how to prevent such acts of terrorism in the future.
2. The focus of international legal and financial measures is against internationalterrorism. Acts of terrorism committed within national boundaries are normally covered by domestic criminal and/or anti-terrorism laws. Therefore, the
term "terrorism" as used in this Article refers to international terrorism.
3. See generally Herbert V. Morais, Behind the Lines in the War on Terrorist Funding, 20 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 34 (2001) (explaining challenges facing governments and

financial institutions in war to combat terrorist funding); Herbert V. Morais, The
War Against Money Laundering, Terrorism and the Financing of Terrorism, LAWASIA
JOURNAL 1 (2002) (reviewing legal and financial measures that have been taken to
combat money laundering, international terrorism and financing of terrorism).
4. See How DID THIS HAPPEN? TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR (James F. Hoge,
Jr. & Gideon Rose eds., 2001) (providing general and early analysis of the Septem-

ber 11 terrorist attacks and related issues); THE AGE OF TERROR: AMERICA AND THE
WORLD AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 (Strobe Talbott & Nayan Chanda eds., 2001) (same);
see also THE 9/11

COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT] (presenting current detailed and definitive analysis).
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Whatever their findings, it is generally agreed that this major terrorist
event has posed new and unusual challenges for governments, financial
institutions and civil societies everywhere in fighting international crime.
A number of factors have contributed, in varying degrees, to a significant growth in international crime. Globalization and regional integration have greatly facilitated the movement of people, goods and services
across borders. The information superhighway has also made it easy and
fast to execute business and financial transactions in cyberspace, often
outside the purview of national regulators and law enforcement authorities, as there is at the present time no clearly established jurisdiction or
governing law that applies to all such transactions. These dynamic developments have certainly brought great benefits for international commerce, trade and travel, but they have also facilitated the growth of
international criminal activity.
This Article will examine some of the legal measures taken at the international level to fight international crime, beginning with a brief introduction to some of the historical antecedents. It will then focus in greater
detail on the measures adopted by international agencies to combat such
crime. The Article will argue that these measures have, in many cases,
been inadequate, inappropriate or poorly implemented. In the case of
terrorism, the problem has been compounded by the United States adopting questionable political and military strategies that are not generally supported by the international community. The resulting lack of an
international consensus on a single, well-thought out strategy poses serious
obstacles to winning the war against international crime, particularly
against terrorism.
The views expressed in this Article reflect my practical experience
from having served as a senior lawyer with three international financial
institutions-the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank
and the Asian Development Bank-which have been at the forefront of
efforts to combat corruption, money laundering and the financing of terrorism. This experience included advising several governments in Asia
and the Pacific, including the People's Republic of China, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and six Pacific islands in strengthening
their legal and institutional regimes to combat money laundering and the
5
financing of terrorism.
5. During 2001-02, I served as the leader of a nineteen-member international
consulting team that executed an Asian Development Bank-financed regional
technical assistance project to combat money laundering in the Asian and Pacific
region. During 2003-04, I also served as the anti-money laundering expert on a
team of the International Law Institute in Washington, D.C., executing another
Asian Development Bank-financed technical assistance project advising the government of the People's Republic of China (including the People's Bank of China, its
central bank) on a banking law reform project. I have also conducted training
programs and prepared training manuals in anti-money laundering for government officials, bankers and staff of the Asian Development Bank.
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
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THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW AGAINST CRIME

Historically, crime has been a matter primarily for national regulation
and law enforcement. The significant growth, however, of international
crime in recent years has given rise to increasing concerns among governments worldwide that more coordinated and effective international measures were called for to combat this scourge. As a result, a substantial body
of international law and standards has gradually developed for the purpose of combating international crime.
The earliest antecedents of this development in international criminal law are the first conventions outlawing piracy, slavery, white slavery and
narcotics production and trafficking. 6 Following the Second World War,
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, signed on August 15, 1945, set out the legal framework
for the prosecution of individuals for crimes against peace, war crimes and
crimes against humanity. 7 This was then followed by United Nations action to sponsor the adoption of the Genocide Convention in 19488 and
the Geneva Conventions in 1949. 9
More recently, international criminal tribunals have been established
to prosecute persons who have committed serious violations of international humanitarian law. In 1998, the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted under the aegis of the United Nations. 10 This Statute confers the ICC with jurisdiction to prosecute "the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
6. See D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 753-56 (2d ed. 1970); HENRYJ.
STEINER & DETLEV F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS: MATERIALS AND
TEXT 827 (4th ed. 2001).
7. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, 39 AM.J. INT'L L. Sup. 257, 258-60 (1945); see also IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 544-47 (3d. ed. 1979); Louis B. SOHN,

CASES ON UNITED NATIONS LAw 904 (1956) (discussing similar material on charter
of International Military Tribunal for Far East established in Tokyo).
8. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted on December 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 278. This convention was adopted in
New York and entered into force on January 12, 1951. The United States signed
this Convention on November 25, 1988.
9. The two relevant conventions are: Convention III, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, adopted on Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.
135; and Convention IV, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, adopted on Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. These were two
of the four conventions adopted by the Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War held in
Geneva from April 21-August 12, 1949. Both Conventions entered into force on
October 21, 1950.
10. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The Rome Statute was adopted
onJuly 17, 1998 by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. The Rome Statute has
been signed by 139 parties, of which ninety-nine have become parties.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss3/5

4

Morais: Fighting International Crime and Its Financing: The Importance of
2005]

587

FIGHTING INTERNATIONAL CRIME

whole" and identifies those crimes as the crime of genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression." This Statute
has been signed by 139 States including the United States. 12 Ad hoc international criminal tribunals have also been set up to prosecute persons for
14
3
similar crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia' and Rwanda.
In 1966, the United Nations adopted two landmark human rights covenants-the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 15 and
16
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
The first Covenant contains various provisions to protect the human dignity of persons, including those prohibiting slavery, servitude and forced
or compulsory labor, torture and inhumane treatment of prisoners.
Against the backdrop of the genocidal activities of Hitler and Stalin and
the apartheid policies in South Africa, the adoption of these Covenants
represented the international community's answer to the summons for action against crimes of violence and discrimination against all peoples, especially minorities, women and children.
In more recent years, a series of other international conventions have
been adopted to firmly establish the foundations of a new international
law framework against crime. The conventions include those that
criminalize trafficking in drugs, various forms of terrorism and the financing of terrorism, transnational organized crime, money laundering and
corruption. These conventions will be discussed in greater detail below. A
final landmark convention that must also be mentioned is the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment ("Torture Convention"), adopted by the United Nations in
1984.17
11. Id. art. 5.
12. The United States signed this treaty on December 31, 2000. For a discussion of the United States' withdrawal from this treaty on May 6, 2002, see infra

notes 230-31.
13. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was established by United Nations Security Council on May 25, 1993. S.C. Res. 827, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
14. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established by the
United Nations Security Council on November 8, 1994. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
15. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, adopted on Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 at 1; BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 205-27 (Ian

Brownlie ed., 5th ed. 2002).
16. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted
on Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW,

supra

note 15, at 197-205.
17. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51,
at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES 39/46 (1984) [hereinafter Torture Convention]. This
Convention was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on
December 10, 1984. The Convention entered into force on June 26, 1987. As of
November 30, 2004, it had 139 parties. The Convention was signed by the United
States on April 18, 1988.
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Finally, over the past decade or so, a number of international organizations, regional organizations, professional and financial supervisory bodies have adopted additional conventions, standards, codes and best
practices to combat criminal activity such as drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, the financing of terrorism and corruption. These will
be discussed more fully in the sections following.
III.

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL
CRIME, INCLUDING THE FINANCING OF CRIME

As noted at the outset, it is difficult to discuss the subject of combating the financing of international crime in isolation from the primary
crimes being financed. There is an intimate link between the primary
crimes and the financing being made available to finance the commission
of such crimes.
A close analysis of the full range of international crimes makes it clear
that it is not appropriate or meaningful to use a single strategy to combat
all categories of international crime because the elements and motivations
of the different international crimes vary significantly. In my opinion,
there are at least two separate categories of international crime. The first
category consists of conventional crimes such as drug trafficking, kidnapping, smuggling and white slavery. The commission of these crimes is motivated solely or primarily by financial greed. The second category, which
will be labeled simply as "political crimes," consists of such crimes as terrorism, the financing of terrorism, hijackings and abductions and assassinations or cold-blooded murder of innocent civilians, such as the
beheadings of foreign nationals in Iraq and of Wall StreetJournal reporter
Daniel Pearl in Pakistan. This second category of crimes is motivated by
political, economic or social objectives, which will be discussed more fully
later in this Article.
While conventional crimes may be solved more readily by the use of
traditional law enforcement tools of prevention, police investigation, prosecution and punishment, "political crimes" clearly require additional and
more sophisticated tools if governments and their law enforcement authorities are to be able to fight them effectively. In addition, the use of
military strategies to fight international crime is inappropriate and likely
to fail. The framework for analysis adopted in this Article will be to recognize the distinctions between these two categories of international crimes.
In the case of "political crimes," the analysis will, therefore, invariably include some commentary on the political dimensions or root causes of such
crimes.
This Article will also argue that there is a close linkage between the
commission of several international crimes, including the financing of
such crimes and corruption. This linkage is explicitly acknowledged in
the new United Nations Convention Against Corruption ("Corruption
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss3/5
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Convention"). 1 8 The widespread prevalence of corruption of public officials, including political leaders, government officials and law enforcement personnel, constitutes one of the most serious impediments to
winning the war against international crime. Thus, any meaningful strategy to combat international crime must fully take into account and consider measures for combating corruption.
In light of the above comments and for the purposes of this Article,
the analysis of strategies to combat international crime will focus on three
major crimes: money laundering, the financing of terrorism and corruption. These three crimes will be considered as different ways in which
financing is being provided for, or generated from, the commission of
other crimes. These crimes feed into each other and thereby produce and
grow funds for further criminal activities. The close linkage between these
crimes is explicitly recognized in a number of international conventions
against international crime, which will be discussed below. Finally, as a
group, these crimes represent a good sampling of international crimes
and will permit an analysis of some of the common issues involved in combating such crimes.
IV.

MONEY LAUNDERING, FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND CORRUPTION

A.

Money Laundering1 9

It is best to begin with a discussion of money laundering because it
provides an essential part of the backdrop to an understanding of the financing of terrorism and corruption. Money laundering is the processing
of the proceeds of crime to disguise their illegal origin. 2 0 More detailed
definitions of the crime of money laundering can be found in the United
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho18. Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/58/422 (2003) [hereinafter Corruption Convention]. The Convention was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on October 31, 2003
and was initially signed in Meridia, Mexico from December 9-11, 2003. As ofJune
8, 2005, the Convention has been signed by 123 States and regional economic
integration organizations, but only twenty-five have become parties. Article 68 of
the Convention provides that it will enter into force on the ninetieth day after the
date of deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession.
19. See Guy STESSENS, MONEY LAUNDERING: A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT MODEL (2000)
(providing comprehensive discussion of
international legal aspects of money laundering); see alsoJEFFREY ROBINSON, THE
LAUNDRYMEN (1996) (discussing subject anecdotally). The websites of the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), http://www.unodc.org, and the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), http://www.fatf-gafi.org, provide excellent
information.
20. See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), What Is
Money Laundering?, at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/29/0,2340,en_322503
79_32235720_33659613 1_1-1.1,00.html (providing simple definition used by
FATF) (last modified on Aug. 6, 2005).
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21
the United Nations
tropic Substances of 1988 ("Vienna Convention");
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000 ("Palermo
23
Convention");22 and the Corruption Convention.
The need to launder funds arises because criminals such as organized
crime syndicates, drug traffickers and corrupt politicians have to quickly
transfer and transform their dirty money into clean funds. They do this
for at least two reasons: first, to separate such funds from the crimes that
generated them (generally referred to as the "predicate offences") and
thereby to avoid detection and criminal prosecution; and second, to protect those funds from seizure and confiscation by the law enforcement
authorities, thereby allowing them to enjoy the fruits of their crimes. The
traditional pattern of money laundering essentially involved making deposits into banks and then arranging wire transfers of those funds to other
24
financial institutions, usually in foreign jurisdictions.

Typically, under national anti-money laundering laws or general criminal laws, the crime of money laundering is defined by reference to the
predicate offences. Predicate offences are usually defined by: (a) the enu21. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 19, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The
Convention entered into force on November 11, 1990. As of November 30, 2004,
the Convention had 170 parties.
22. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A.
Res. 55/25, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (2000) [hereinafter Palermo Convention]. The Convention was adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly on November 15, 2000. The Convention entered into force on September 29, 2003. Id. As of June 14, 2005, the Convention had been signed by 147
States and 106 of them had become Parties. See United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime, available at http://www.unodc.org/
unodc/en/crimecicp.signatures-convention.html. Money laundering and corruption are among the four crimes criminalized by this Convention. I do not
propose to discuss separately transnational organized crime as such. Organized
criminal groups are, of course, heavily involved in the commission or abetment of
money laundering, the financing of terrorism, corruption and a host of other
crimes.
23. Corruption Convention, supra note 18, arts. 14, 23.
24. The process of money laundering normally involves three stages: placement, layering and integration. The first stage, placement, is when the criminal
introduces the proceeds of his crime into the financial system. This is usually done
by breaking up large sums of cash into smaller, less conspicuous amounts that are
then deposited into a bank account or used to purchase financial instruments such
as checks, money orders or securities. The second stage, layering, involves a series
of transactions to convert or transfer the funds, usually to other foreign jurisdictions and financial institutions, including offshore financial centres. Such conversion or transfer typically occurs through wire transfers and the purchase and sale
of investment instruments. Often, such conversion or transfers are disguised as
payments for goods or services through false invoicing so as to give them the appearance of legitimacy. In the third and final stage, integration, the funds re-enter
the legitimate economy as "clean" money. The criminal then freely uses this
money to invest in a variety of assets such as real estate including office buildings
and houses, automobiles, yachts and jewelry, or to enter into new business ventures. See FATF, Basic Facts About Money Laundering,at http://www.fatf-gafi.org (last

modified on Oct. 9, 2003).
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meration of a list of serious offences under national laws, such as drug
trafficking, smuggling, illegal arms sales, prostitution, corruption, tax evasion, terrorism, embezzlement and gambling; or (b) reference to all serious offences under national laws, which carry a specified penalty of
25
imprisonment, or both.
Because of the clandestine nature of money laundering, it is very difficult to determine the precise magnitude of the money laundered globally
on an annual basis. The IMF has placed the estimate at between two and
five per cent of the world's gross domestic product. 26 Using 1996 figures,
this translates to between $600 billion and $1.5 trillion.
At the international level, several legal measures have been developed
over the last sixteen years to fight money laundering. These measures
consist of a mixture of "hard law" and "soft law." 2 7 The "hard law" consists
of international treaty obligations or international decisions, usually
adopted under the aegis of the United Nations or regional organizations
that are legally binding on sovereign member States. The "soft law" consists of various recommendations, guidelines, codes and best practices issued by different international organizations and financial supervisory
bodies. 28 These latter prescriptions are not legally binding but have
strong persuasive effect.
The first shots in the war against money laundering were fired in 1988
when-in the specific context of the war against drug trafficking-the
United Nations sponsored the adoption of the Vienna Convention. 29 This
was the first international treaty to call on States to criminalize the laundering of the proceeds of crimes.
In the Preamble to the Vienna Convention, the States Parties recorded their awareness:
[T]hat illicit [drug] traffic generates large financial profits and
wealth enabling transnational criminal organizations to penetrate, contaminate and corrupt the structures of government, legitimate commercial and financial business, and society at all its
levels, [and, therefore, expressed their determination] to deprive
persons engaged in illicit traffic of the proceeds of their criminal
25. FATF, The Forty Recommendations, at Recommendation 1 (2003), available at
http://www.oecd.org/faff/40Recs en.htm [hereinafter FATF Forty].
26. Michel Camdessus, Address to the FATF at the Plenary Meeting of the
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (Feb. 10, 1998), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/1998/021098.htm.
27. For a discussion of the differences between "hard" law and "soft" law, see
Herbert V. Morais, The Quest for InternationalStandards: Global Governance vs. Sovereignty, 50 U. KAN. L. REv. 779 (2002) (discussing practical implications of such
distinction for compliance and enforcement).
28. For a discussion of international norms that consist of a mix of "hard" and
"soft" law to fight international money laundering, see infra notes 29-100 and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of the Vienna Convention, see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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activities and thereby eliminate their main incentive for so
doing ....30
The provisions of the Convention deal primarily with measures to
combat illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and
related law enforcement issues. There is, however, one provision that
deals directly with the laundering of the proceeds derived from the offences established by the Convention. Article 3, Section 1 "Offences and
Sanctions" of the Convention sets out a number of provisions calling on
States Parties to adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish certain acts, including money laundering, as criminal offences under their
national laws.
Article 3, Section 1 (b) of the Convention defines the crime of money
laundering as follows:
(i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such
property is derived from any offence or offences established in
accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, or from an
act of participation in such offence or offences, for the purpose
of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of
assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an
offence or offences to evade the legal consequences of his
actions;
(ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership
of property, knowing that such property is derived from an offence or offences established in accordance with subparagraph
(a) of this paragraph or from an act of participation in such an
offence or offences; ....31
Section 4 of the Convention then requires State Parties to establish
sanctions for the offences set forth in Section 1 taking into account "the
grave nature of these offences." Accordingly, punishment through "imprisonment or other forms of deprivation of liberty, pecuniary sanctions
and confiscation" was stipulated as the appropriate sanction. The other
32
provisions of the Convention deal with jurisdiction over the offences,
confiscation, 33 extradition,3 4 mutual legal assistance 35 and other measures
36
for international cooperation.
In June 1998, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Political Declaration and Action Plan Against Money Laundering at its Twenti30. Id.

31. Id. art. 1.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art. 4.
art. 5.
art. 6.
art. 7.
arts. 8-20.
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eth Special Session devoted to "countering the world drug problem
together."3 7 The General Assembly Resolution urged all states to implement the provisions of the Vienna Convention and "other relevant international instruments on money laundering" and then set out a list of
38
guiding principles for national action.
In August 2000, the Palermo Convention was adopted in Palermo,
Italy. 39 Recognizing that, in the post-Cold War era, various forms of transnational organized crime posed a serious threat to security, democracy,
the rule of law and political and financial stability, the Convention requires State Parties to outlaw some of the most common offences, such as
involvement or participation in organized criminal groups, money laundering and corruption of public officials.4 0 It is particularly noteworthy
that this Convention includes two articles dealing with the criminalization
of the laundering of the proceeds of serious crimes 4 1 and two other ?.rticles dealing with the criminalization of corruption. 42 The definition of
the money laundering offence incorporated in this Convention is substantially identical to that included in the Vienna Convention and other inter43
national conventions and regulations.
Finally, it should be noted that the Corruption Convention includes
two comprehensive provisions calling on State Parties to criminalize all
forms of money laundering under their national laws. 44 In addition, it is
particularly noteworthy that money laundering has been included as one
of the major targets in the war against corruption.
The United Nations' efforts to combat money laundering are coordinated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), by
way of its Global Program Against Money Laundering (GPML). Through
the GPML, the UNODC assists member countries with policy development, legislation, technical assistance, problem solving and training in
45
combating money laundering.
37. G.A. Res. S20/4D, U.N. GAOR, 20th Special Sess., U.N. Doc. A/S-20/
AC.1/L.1 (1998). This declaration was adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly on June 10, 1998.
38. Id. 15.
39. Palermo Convention, supra note 22.
40. Id. arts. 5-9.
41. Id. arts. 6, 7.
42. Id. arts. 8, 9.
43. See id. art. 6, § 1 (a). Other Conventions have adopted similar definitions
of money laundering. See Corruption Convention, supra note 18, arts. 14, 23 (discussing measures to prevent money laundering and defining money laundering
respectively); Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the
Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, art. 6, § 1 (a), Europ. T.S. No. 141 [hereinafter
Convention on Laundering] (providing definition of money laundering and proposed preventive measures).
44. For a detailed discussion on the Corruption Convention, see infra notes
144-59 and accompanying text.
45. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, About Us, at http://
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about.html (explaining objectives of organization).
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A number of key regional organizations have also adopted legal measures to combat money laundering. The Council of Europe 46 adopted the
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime in 1990 in Strasbourg. 4 7 This Convention contains both
substantive law provisions to combat money laundering, as well as mechanisms for international cooperation and mutual assistance in criminal matters. An interesting feature of this Convention is that the Council may
invite any non-member state to accede to the Convention. In 1991, the
Council of the European Communities issued Council Directive 91/308/
EEC on "Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of
Money Laundering" ("Council Directive") .48 This Directive is legally binding on member States and deals largely with the prevention of money
laundering through the abuse of the financial system. Finally, in 1999, the
Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the Model Regulations
Concerning Laundering Offences Connected to Illicit Drug Trafficking
and Related Offences, prepared by the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD). 4 9 These CICAD Model Regulations are intended to serve as a guide to OAS member countries in the adoption of
national laws against money laundering.
Outside the framework of the United Nations and the regional organizations, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental
46. See Council of Europe, The Council of Europe's Member States, at http://
www.coe.int/T/e/com/about-Coe/memberstates/default.asp (listing Council of
Europe's forty-six member countries: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova,
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation,
San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine and United
Kingdom).
47. See Convention on Laundering, supra note 43.
48. See Council Directive 91/308/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77, available at
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/124016.htm. This website also provides the 2001 amendment to the Council Directive. See Council Directive 2001/
97/EC, 2001 OJ. (L 344) 76, available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/
sga-doc?smartapi!celexplus! prod !DocNumber&lg=en&type_ doc=Directive&an_
doc=2001&nu doc=97 (amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on "Prevention
of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering"). The
European Union consists of twenty-five member countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and United Kingdom). See
Council of the European Union, The European Union at a Glance, at http://europa.eu.int/abc/index_en.htm# (listing member States) (last visited Apr. 22,

2005).
49. See CICAD, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, Model Regulations Concerning Laundering Offenses Connected to Illicit Drug Trafficking and Other
Serious Offences, available at http://www.imolin.org/imolin/en/cicadml.html (last
visited Apr. 22, 2005).
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group established by the Group of Seven (G-7) 50 in Paris in 1989, has the
primary responsibility for coordinating global efforts to combat money
laundering. The FATF consists of thirty-one memberjurisdictions and two
international organizations, the European Commission and the Gulf Cooperation Council. 5 1 The FATF maintains a small Secretariat at the offices
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and is assisted in its work by a number of regional FATF-style
52
bodies such as: the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG),
53
the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the Council of Europe Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (MONEYVAL, formerly PC-R-EV), 54 the Eurasian Group
(EAG), 5 5 the Financial Action Task Force of South America Against
Money Laundering (GAFISUD) ,56 the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti50. See A Guide to Committees, Groups, and Clubs, at http://www.imf.org/external/ np/exr/facts/groups.htm#G7 (listing participants of G-7 Summit: Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States).
51. See FATF, Members and Observers, at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/
52/0,2340,en_32250379_32237295_34027188111_1 ,00.html (stating that
FATF's thirty-three member jurisdictions are: Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Gulf Co-operation Council, Hong Kong-China, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States) (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
52. See The Asian Pacific Group on Money Laundering, MemberJurisdictions,at
http://ww.apgml.org/content/member-jurisdiction.jsp (stating that APG consists of twenty-eight member jurisdictions: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Chinese Taipei, Cook Islands, Fiji Islands, Hong Kong-China,
India, Indonesia, Japan, Macau-China, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Niue, Pakistan, Palau, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa,
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United States and Vanuatu) (last visited Apr. 22,
2005).
53. See Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, Membership, at http://
www.cfatf.org/ eng/ (stating that CFATF consists of twenty-five member jurisdictions: Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda,
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, St.
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad &
Tobago, Turks & Caicos Islands and Venezuela) (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
54. See Council of Europe, About MONEYVAL, at http://www.coe.int /T/E/
Legal-affairs/Legal-co-operation/Combating-economic crime/Moneylaunder(stating that
ing/ General_information/AboutMONEYVAL.asp#TopOfPage
MONEYVAL consists of twenty-seven member jurisdictions: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova,
Monaco, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Ukraine) (last
visited Apr. 22, 2005).
55. See Eurasian Group, Members & Observers, at http://www.euroasiangroup.
org/members.html (listing six member jurisdictions: Belarus, China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan) (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
56. See Financial Action Task Force of South America Against Money Laundering, at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/Ctry-orgpages/org-gafisuden.htm (stating
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Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) 5 7 and the Middle East and North
8
Africa FATF (MENAFATF) .
In 1990, the FATF published the Forty Recommendations on Money
Laundering ("FATF Forty") 59 to provide detailed recommendations and
guidelines to member and non-member countries and financial institutions on how to formulate and implement measures to combat money
laundering. The FATF Forty were revised and reissued in 1996. In June
2003, the FATF Forty were substantially revised and reissued to reflect the
accumulated experience, to take account of the new typologies of money
laundering identified by the FATF's annual typologies exercises, and finally to cover the financing of terrorism. The FATF Forty has been aptly
described as "the crown jewel of soft law" against money laundering. 6°
The recommendations set out in the FATF Forty, as revised, are divided
into four major categories.
1.

Recommendations to Strengthen National Legal Systems

These recommendations, addressed to countries, set out various legislative measures that should be taken to prevent, detect and punish money
laundering. The most important of these measures is the criminalization
61
of money laundering. Going well beyond the 1996 Recommendations,
that GAFISUD consists of nine member jurisdictions: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) (last updated Nov. 4,
2003).
57. See ESAAMLG, Members, at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/Ctry-orgpages/orgesaamlg en.htm (stating that ESAAMLG consists of eleven member jurisdictions:
Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Uganda) (last updatedJune 24, 2003).
58. See Press Release, Bahrain Ministry of Finance and National Economy,
Press Release of the Inaugural Ministerial Meeting of the Middle East & North
Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) Against Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing (November 30, 2004), at http://www.mofne.gov.bh/English/
news-detaii.asp?ID=286 (stating MENAFATF is newest FATF-style regional body established at inaugural ministerial meeting convened in Manama, Bahrain on November 29-30, 2004). MENAFATF consists of the following fourteen member
jurisdictions: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Id.
59. FATF Forty, supra note 25 (providing 1996 and 2003 versions of FATF
Forty).
60. STESSENS, supra note 19, at 17.
61. The 1996 version of FATF Forty contained a weak and limited provision
on the criminalization of money laundering. See FATF Forty (1996), supra note 25,
at Recommendation 4 ("Each country should extend the offence of drug money
laundering to one based on serious offences. Each country would determine
which serious crimes would be designated as money laundering predicate offences."). The result was that countries differed widely in their formulation of the
money laundering offence, often listing only a few serious offences as predicate
offences. Because only a few predicate offences are listed, many other forms of
money laundering derived from other serious offences can go unpunished because they do not constitute the offence of money laundering under the limited
definition used in the law.
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the latest FATF Forty calls on countries to "apply the crime of money laundering to all serious offences, with a view to including the widest range of
predicate offences." 62 To this end, each country "should at a minimum
include a range of offences within each of the designated categories of
offences." 63 The term "designated categories of offences" is defined as
64
twenty categories of crimes.
In addition, the FATF Forty includes a number of other recommendations calling on countries to ensure that predicate offences for money
laundering "extend to conduct that occurred in another country, which
constitutes an offence in that country, and which would have constituted a
predicate offence had it occurred domestically." 65 Countries are also
asked to apply criminal liability and, where that is not possible, civil or
administrative liability, to legal persons; 66 adopt provisions for the freezing, seizure and confiscation of criminal assets; 67 ensure that financial institution secrecy laws do not inhibit the implementation of FATF Forty; 68
adopt "safe harbour" rules to protect financial institutions, their directors,
officers and employees from criminal and civil liability if they report suspicious transactions; 69 and to establish effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions (criminal, civil or administrative) for both natural and legal
70
persons.
2.

Recommendations to Strengthen Customer Due Diligence, Reporting of
Suspicious Transactions, Regulation and Supervision

This second set of recommendations, previously limited in their application to banks and non-bank financial institutions, seeks to strengthen
and broaden the standards for exercising customer due diligence, verifying the identity of customers and reporting suspicious transactions to the
62. See FATF Forty (2003), supra note 25, at Recommendation 1.
63. Id.
64. Id. The definition of "designated categories of offences" in the Glossary
attached to FATF Forty lists the following twenty categories of offences: organized
crime and racketeering; terrorism, including terrorist financing; trafficking in
human beings and migrant smuggling; sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children; illicit trafficking in narcotics drugs and psychotropic substances; illicit arms trafficking; illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods;
corruption and bribery; fraud; counterfeiting currency; counterfeiting and piracy
of products; environmental crime; murder, grievous bodily injury; kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking; robbery or theft; smuggling; extortion; forgery;
piracy; and insider trading and market manipulation. Id. at Glossary.
65. Id. at Recommendation 1.
66. See id. at Recommendation 2.
67. See id. at Recommendation 3.
68. See id. at Recommendation 4.
69. See id. at Recommendation 14 (noting that these officials are
"[p]rohibited by law from disclosing the fact that a suspicious transaction report
(STR) or related information is being reported to the [Financial Intelligence
Unit]").
70. See id. at Recommendations 2, 17.
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authorities. Most importantly, the definition of "financial institutions" was
broadened to cover any person or entity who conducts, as a business, one
or more of thirteen separate activities or operations for or on behalf of a
customer. 71 Particularly noteworthy is the inclusion of a new recommen-

dation calling on countries to stipulate, at a minimum, that "businesses
providing a service of money or value transfer should be licensed or regis-

tered, and subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance with national requirements to combat money laundering and
72
terrorist financing."
Next, two new recommendations were introduced to extend the application of these standards to certain "designated non-financial businesses and professions," which has been defined to mean casinos, real
estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones, lawyers, notaries and

other independent legal professionals and accountants and trust and company service providers when they are involved with their clients or custom73
ers in preparing or executing financial or similar transactions.
Countries are also urged to consider applying FATF Forty to businesses
and professions other than designated non-financial businesses and pro74
fessions that pose a money laundering or terrorist financing risk.
In addition, more elaborate standards have been specified for the verification of customer identity, particularly with respect to the identity of
beneficial owners and the nature of intended business relationships and
transactions. 75 Of particular significance are the new recommendations
calling on financial institutions to implement enhanced customer diligence measures in relation to "politically exposed persons" (PEPs) 76 with
71. See id. at Glossary (defining financial institutions). The thirteen activities
or operations listed in the definition are: acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public; lending; financial leasing; the transfer of money or
value; issuing and managing means of payment (e.g., credit and debit cards,
checks, traveler's checks, money orders, bankers' drafts and electronic money);
financial guarantees and commitments; trading in money market instrumentsincluding checks, bills, CDs and derivatives-foreign exchange, exchange, interest
rate and index instruments, transferable securities, commodity futures trading;
participation in securities issues and the provision of financial services related to
such issues; individual and collective portfolio management; safekeeping and administration of cash or liquid securities on behalf of other persons; otherwise investing, administering or managing funds or money on behalf of other persons:
underwriting and placement of life insurance and other investment-related insurance; and money and currency changing.
72. ld. at Recommendation 23. For further discussion of this new provision
and its impact on the financing of terrorism, see infra notes 73-89 and accompanying text.
73. See FATF Forty, supra note 25, at Recommendations 12, 16.
74. See id. at Recommendation 20.
75. See id. at Recommendation 5.
76. See id. at Recommendation 6. In the Glossary attached to FATF Forty, the
term "politically exposed persons" is defined as, "individuals who are or have been
entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign country, for example
Heads of State or of government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or
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599

a view to targeting corruption, one of the major sources of money laundering, and cross-border correspondent banking relationships. 77 The recommendations also call on financial institutions to maintain records for at
least five years78 and to establish appropriate training, compliance management and audit systems.

79

Finally, the recommendations call on countries to strengthen the regulation and supervision of financial institutions. Of particular significance
are those calling on competent authorities to "take the necessary legal or
regulatory measures to prevent criminals or their associates from holding
or being the beneficial owner of a significant or controlling interest or
holding a management function in a financial institution,"8 0 sometimes
referred to as the application of "fit and proper tests" or "integrity standards" for financial institution officials.
3.

Recommendations to Strengthen Institutional and Other Measures

The third set of recommendations, addressed to countries, deals with
strengthening institutional and other measures for the enforcement of
laws to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The
first of these recommendations calls on countries to establish a Financial
Intelligence Unit (FIU) to serve as a national center for receiving, requesting, analyzing and disseminating suspicious transaction reports for law enforcement purposes.8 ' The task of financial intelligence is a highly
specialized one. It requires high technical and forensic skills as the typical
money laundering case is complex, cross-border in nature and difficult to
unravel. The FIU also serves as a focal point for coordination and cooperation with FIUs in other jurisdictions in the investigation of money laundering and financing of terrorism cases. The second series of
recommendations calls on countries to properly equip their law enforcement authorities with the necessary powers of investigation, including the
ability to obtain documents and information for their investigations and to
furnish adequate financial, human and technical resources and effective
mechanisms to these authorities to enable them to carry out their respon82
sibilities effectively.
The next set of recommendations under this heading calls on countries to prevent the unlawful use of legal persons by money launderers,
military officials, senior executives of state owned-corporations, important political
party officials." See id. at Glossary.
77. See id. at Recommendation 7 (listing additional duties of financial
institutions).
78. See id. at Recommendation 10 (explaining records would enable financial
institutions "to comply swiftly with information requests from the competent
authorities").
79. See id. at Recommendation 15.
80. Id. at Recommendation 23.
81. See id. at Recommendation 26.
82. See id. at Recommendations 27-32.
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particularly by ensuring that there is adequate, accurate and timely information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons83 and to
prevent the unlawful use of legal arrangements (such as express trusts) by
money launderers, through information requirements similar to those set
forth in Recommendation 5.84
4.

Recommendations to Strengthen International Cooperation and Mutual
Assistance Measures
The final set of recommendations asks countries to cooperate closely

and effectively with, and extend mutual legal assistance to, other foreign
judicial and law enforcement authorities in money laundering and terrorist financing investigations.

Specifically, countries are asked to rapidly,

constructively and effectively provide the widest possible range of mutual
legal assistance and cooperation in investigations, prosecutions and related proceedings. 8 5 Such cooperation and assistance should also extend
to requests by foreign countries to identify, freeze, seize and confiscate

property laundered, proceeds from money laundering or predicate offences, instrumentalities used in or intended for use in the commission of
these offences or property of corresponding value. Countries are encouraged to enter into arrangements for coordinating seizure and confis86
cation proceedings, which may include the sharing of confiscated assets.

Finally, the recommendations call for cooperation in the extradition (or,
where that is not possible, the prosecution) of criminals involved.8 7 There
are several other related recommendations that space does not permit fur88
ther discussion of in this Article.
As the FATF Forty belongs to the realm of recommendations, it represents the "soft law" against money laundering and the financing of terrorism. This raises an interesting issue as to its legal status or effect.8 9 In and
of themselves, these recommendations are persuasive in nature and do
not impose legal obligations on FATF members or non-member jurisdic-

tions. On the other hand, I would strongly argue that, to the extent that
83. See id. at Recommendation 33.
84. See id. at Recommendation 34.
85. See id. at Recommendations 36, 40.
86. See id. at Recommendation 38.
87. See id. at Recommendation 39.
88. For further details of the FATF's activities and additional commentary on
FATF Forty, see the FATF website located at http://www.faff-gafi.org. See FATF,
THE FINANCIAL WAR ON TERRORISM: A GUIDE BY THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE
(2004) (containing full texts of FATF Forty and FATF Eight, including "Interpretative Notes and Best Practices"); COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, A MODEL OF BEST
PRACTICE FOR COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR (2000). It
should be noted that the Commonwealth Secretariat book was published before
the issuance of the revised FATF Forty in June 2003. See also PAUL ALLEN SCHOTT,
REFERENCE GUIDE TO ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF

(World Bank/International Monetary Fund, 2d ed. 2004).
89. See Morais, supra note 27, at 780-82 (discussing issue).

TERRORISM
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these recommendations amplify or elaborate on general principles of law
or legal obligations already set out in several international treaties, conventions and numerous national laws, they carry a strong expectation of
adherence if not compliance. Furthermore, to the extent that these recommendations seek to proscribe an international crime, it could be argued that there should be little or no disagreement within the community
of States as to the achievement of the objectives of these recommendations
notwithstanding differences of opinion on the means to achieve them.
A number of other international financial supervisory bodies have
also been active in combating money laundering through the adoption
and issuance of recommendations, directives, guidelines and best practices. Notable among these is the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (previously called the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and
Supervisory Practices), established by the central bank governors of the
Group of Ten (G-10) countries in 1974.90 This Committee issued a Statement on Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money Laundering in 1988.91 In 1997, the Basel Committee
issued the Core Principles of Banking Supervision. 92 The Committee also
issued detailed guidelines on Customer Due Diligence for Banks in October 2001.93 All of these prescriptions call on banking supervisors to ensure that banks have internal policies, practices and procedures, including
"know your customer" procedures. These procedures are designed to prevent banks from being used, intentionally or unintentionally, by criminal
elements. It is important to note that, while the Basel Committee essentially represents the G-10 industrial countries and its principles and recommendations are advisory in character, its recommendations are given great
weight by national bank supervisory bodies throughout the world.
In 1992, the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO), whose members are national securities commissions, stock exchanges and regional and international organizations, adopted a Resolution on Money Laundering, which sets out anti-money laundering
guidelines for its members. 94 In 1998, it issued the IOSCO Objectives and
90. The G-10 is a misleading name because the Group's membership now
consists of eleven States: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

For more information on the functioning of G-10 or the Bank for International
Settlements, see the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) website located at

http://www.bis.org/about/functions.htm.
91. See BIS, Statement on Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System, at http:/
/www.bis.org/publ/bcbscl37.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
92. See BIS, Core Principles for Banking Supervision (Sept. 1997), at http://
www.bis.org / publ/bcbscl02.pdf.
93. See BIS, Customer Due Diligence for Banks (Oct. 2001), at http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85.pdf.
94. See International Organization of Securities Commissions (ISOCO) (President's Committee), A Resolution on Money Laundering (1992), at http://
www.iosco.org/ resolutions.pdf/IOSCORESS.pdf.
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Principles, which outlines key measures for national securities supervisors
9 5
to take to counter fraud and money laundering.
Similarly, in 2003, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), an association of national insurance supervisors established in
1994, issued the Insurance Core Principles and Methodology to guide insurance supervisors in countering fraud and money laundering.9 6 In
Anti2004, the IAIS issued a very comprehensive Guidance Paper 9on
7
Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism.
At the private sector level, eleven major international private banks
known as the Wolfsberg Group, in cooperation with Transparency International, adopted the Global Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines for Private Banking ("Wolfsberg AML Principles") in October 2000. In January
2002, the Wolfsberg Group issued the Statement on the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism. The statement sets forth a number of guidelines for financial institutions to follow in order to prevent the flow of
terrorist funds through the financial system.9 8 The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), established in 1977, has issued guidance on
the role of auditors in detecting fraud and errors in financial statements,
in particular ISA 240.99
To sum up the discussion of international legal measures adopted to
combat money laundering, it is clear that there is currently a formidable
body of international treaty law that criminalizes money laundering. This
body of "hard law" is supported by a second hierarchy of "soft law"-recommendations, guidelines and international best practices-that have
served to put flesh and bones on the general principles set out in the international treaties and conventions. It is left to individual countries to implement this body of law through the adoption and enforcement of

national laws and regulations, the establishment of effective institutional
arrangements and the extension of cooperation and mutual assistance to
other jurisdictions. Likewise, financial institutions and other entities and
95. See ISOCO, IOSCO Objectives and Principlesof Securities Regulations (1998), at
http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD82.pdf (discussing need for effective system of securities regulation).
96. See International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), Insurance
Core Principles and Methodology (Oct. 2003), at http://www.iaisweb.org/358coreprinciples methodologyoct03revised.pdf.
97. See IAIS, GuidancePaperon Anti-Money Laundering and Combatingthe Financing of Terrorism (Oct. 2004), at http://wvw.iaisweb.org/133_185-ENV.html.asp
(explaining vulnerability of insurance sector with respect to money laundering and
terrorist financing and providing guidance to insurance supervisors in monitoring
compliance with international standards). This Guidance Paper replaces an earlier version that was first issued in January 2002.
98. See Press Release, Wolfsberg Statement on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Jan. 25, 2002), at http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/pressrel-02.html (emphasizing important role for banks in fight against terrorism).
99. See International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, Auditor's Responsibility to ConsiderFraud in an Audit of FinancialStatements (ISA 240) (revised Feb.
2004), at http://www.ifac.org/IAASB/ProjectHistory.php?ProjID=0006.
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persons involved are expected to implement such rules through their internal policies, operations and systems.
B.
1.

Financingof Terrorism'0 0

What Is Terrorism?

By way of background to the discussion of the financing of terrorism,
it is useful to have a general understanding of what constitutes terrorism. 10 ' Between 1982 and 2003, there have been close to 9,500 separate
acts of terrorism throughout the world. 10 2 In more recent years, one of
the frightening features of these terrorist acts is that several were carried
out by suicide bombers. Suicide attacks represent only about two to three
percent of all terrorist attacks, but they have accounted for more than half
the deaths. 10 3 Suicide terrorism raises a number of intriguing questions
100. See FATF, supra note 88;
THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM:

SCHOTr,

A

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SUPPRESSING
HANDBOOK FOR LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING

(2003);

supra note 88.

101. SeeJESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD: WHY RELIGIOUS MILITANTs KILL 141-45 (2003) (discussing subject of terrorism, particularly so-called
"religious terrorism"). This is an interesting book based upon the author's interviews with extremist members of three religions (Christianity, Judaism and Islam)
around the world. A leading expert on terrorism, Stern is a lecturer at Harvard
University's Kennedy School of Government. See CALEB CARR, THE LESSONS OF
TERROR: A HISTORY OF WARFARE AGAINST CIVILIANS: WHY IT HAS ALWAYS FAILED AND
WHY IT WILL FAIL AGAIN 5 (2001) (arguing that roots of modern international
terrorism can be found "within discipline of military history"); JOHN L. ESPOSITO,
UNHOLY WAR: TERROR IN THE NAME OF ISLAM 20-25 (2002) (discussing factors that
give rise to acts of terrorism in name of Islam); ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL
QAEDA: GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERROR 60-84 (2002) (recognizing that terrorist organizations have become increasingly sophisticated with financing, intelligence and
training);

PHILIP

B.

A COMMONSENSE STRATEGY
9 (2001) (describing force of terrorism as its psycholog-

HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA:

FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

(1998);

ical rather than physical impact); BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM
MARK
JUERGENSMEYER, TERROR IN THE MIND OF GOD: THE GLOBAL RISE OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE

3-15 (2000) (considering political/religious contexts that produce acts of so-

called religious violence);

WALTER LAQUER, TERRORISM 1 (1977) (addressing "the
doctrine of systematic terrorism, the sociology of terrorist groups, current interpretations of terrorism, its common patterns, motive and aims, and the efficacy of
terrorism").
102. See Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep't of State,
Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, Appendix G - Statistical Review (revised June 22,
2004), availableat http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31751.htm [herein-

after Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003]
103. See, e.g., Scott Atran, Genesis of Suicide Terrorism, 299 Scl. 1534, 1535
(2003) (providing historical account of suicide terrorism); Scott Atran, Mishan-

dling Suicide Terrorism, WASH. Q., June 22, 2004, at 67, 70 (criticizing United States
response to suicide terrorists); Riaz Hassan, Terroristsand Their Tools-Part I, YALE
GLOBAL ONLINE MAG. (Apr. 23, 2004), at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=3749 (discussing underlying causes of and arguing for more
thoughtful responses to suicide terrorism); Robert A. Pape, The Strategic Logic of
Terrorism, 97 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 343 (2003) (explaining strategic rationale behind
"growing phenomenon of suicide terrorism"). Mr. Pape teaches at the University
of Chicago and Mr. Atran teaches at the University of Michigan. Professor Hassan,
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and difficulties for law enforcement and poses unique challenges for the
prevention of this form of terrorism.
Among the most notable recent terrorist acts, apart from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, were the bombing of Pan Am flight 103, the
bombing of the United States air base at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia,
the bombing of the United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salam,
the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, the release of nerve gas in the
Tokyo subway system, the bombing of the commuter train system in Madrid and the recent bombing of schools in Chechnya. The targets and
methods of terrorism vary widely, and it is not easy to make any meaningful generalizations of these events or to develop any single strategy to prevent and punish such crimes.
So, what really is terrorism? The terms "terrorism" and "terrorist" are
highly controversial, and considerable debate has raged over the meaning
of these terms. Attempts to define and control "terrorism" go back as far
as 1937 to the League of Nations, which failed to reach an agreement on
its meaning and the measures to fight it. The United Nations has also
worked on this subject for many years, but has not yet been able to reach
an agreement on a single comprehensive convention against terrorism or
a universally accepted meaning of terrorism. In 1997, Rosalyn Higgins
highlighted this problem when she stated: "Terrorism is a term without
any legal significance. It is merely a convenient way of alluding to activities, whether of States or of individuals, widely disapproved of and in
which either the methods used are unlawful, or the targets protected, or
both." 104 Some argue that because of the absence of universal agreement
on the meaning of "terrorism," States have been unable to entrust internaas the ICC with jurisdiction to prosecute and
tional criminal tribunals such
0 5
crime.
of
type
this
punish
On the other hand, the United Nations has been quite successful in
developing a substantial body of international treaty law on terrorism consisting primarily of twelve separate multilateral conventions aimed at
criminalizing several distinct types of terrorist acts. 10 6 One of these conwho teaches the sociology of religion including Islam, is a Professor of Sociology at
Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia, and is also a leading expert on suicidehaving published several books and articles on this subject.
104. Rosalyn Higgins, The General International Law of Terrorism, in

INTERNA-

13 (Rosalyn Higgins & Maurice Flory eds., 1997).
105. See Gilbert Guillaume, Terrorism and InternationalLaw, 53 Itrr'L & COMP.

TIONAL LAW AND TERRORISM

L.Q. 537, 541 (2004).
106. See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 229; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 284; Convention on
the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, March 1, 1991
[hereinafter Plastic Explosives Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678
U.N.T.S. 221; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, March 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S.
304; Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
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ventions, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism ("Terrorism Financing Convention")1 07 has adopted the
following definition of terrorism in the context of criminalizing the financing of terrorism:
(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and
as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex;' 08 or
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part
in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international
organization to do or abstain from doing any act. 109
At the regional level, several other international and regional organizations have also adopted conventions to combat terrorism. These organizations include the Council of Europe, the OAS, the Organization of
African Unity, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the
League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and
the Commonwealth of Independent States. 110 These conventions generally seek to strengthen legal measures for mutual assistance and cooperation among member States in criminal investigations and proceedings
related to terrorism offences.
This substantial development of international treaty law supported by
national laws has led one leading international criminal law scholar,
Antonio Cassese, to make the plausible argument that there is in fact
broad agreement among States as to what terrorism means. Cassese arInternational Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 627; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, March 3, 1980, 1456 U.N.T.S. 124; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S.
205; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035
U.N.T.S. 167; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention on
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 704
U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Aircraft Convention]. For a summary description and
the texts of these Conventions, see http://untreaty.un.org./ English/Terrorism.
asp.
107. See G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 76th plen. mtg., Annex,
Agenda Item 160, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (2000) [hereinafter Terrorism Financing Convention].
108. The nine treaties listed in the annex are those specified in supra note
106, except for the following three: Terrorism Financing Convention, supra note
107; Aircraft Convention, supra note 106; Plastic Explosives Convention, supra note
106.
109. Terrorism Financing Convention, supra note 107, art. 2.1.
110. For a summary description and the texts of these regional conventions,
see the United Nations Treaty Collection (Conventions on Terrorism) located at
http://untreaty.un.org/.
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gues that the only real disagreement among States is whether the acts of
national liberation movements or "freedom fighters" should be excluded
from the definition of terrorism, as demanded by several developing countries."'I One international agreement already does this. Article 2(a) of
the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism excludes the following acts from its general condemnation: "Peoples' struggles including armed struggle against
foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at libof intereration and self-determination in accordance with the principles
1
national law shall not be considered a terrorist crime." 12
Part of the reason for the continuing disagreement over the meaning
of "terrorism" and "terrorist" is that these terms are multifaceted and carry
legal, political and even religious overtones. 113 History, politics and culture have also shaped the public's understanding and opinions as to what
constitutes terrorism, who should properly be classified as terrorists and
which entities should be classified as terrorist organizations. Similarly,
there are differences of opinion at the political level depending on which
side of the political spectrum one is on as to whether the Irish Republican
Army, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the African National Congress in South Africa during the apartheid era or the Tamil Tigers in Sri
Lanka are or were terrorist organizations because they advocated the use
of or actually used violence to advance their political agenda. Several leading political figures such as David Ben-Gurion, Menachem Begin, Nelson
Mandela and Yasser Arafat were once called terrorists, but following the
success of their political missions were rehabilitated and became leaders of
their countries. It has been observed that "one man's terrorist is another
114
man's freedom fighter."
To compound the problem, some terrorists who are Muslim have improperly used their Islamic religion to justify their acts of terrorism, calling
this a holy war or jihad against the infidels. This too has caused considerable confusion, in addition to casting a slur on one of the great religions of
the world and on the vast majority of law-abiding Muslims. 1 15 Although
111. See Antonio Cassese, Terronism as an InternationalCrime, in ENFORCING INAGAINST TERRORISM 213-14 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004)

TERNATIONAL LAw NoRMS

(explaining that lack of agreement on definition of "terrorism" is actually rooted
in lack of agreement on "freedom fighter" exception).
112. Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, July 1, 1999, art. 2(a), at http://www.oic-un.org/
26icfm/c.html.
113. See EQBAL AHMED, TERRORISM, THEIRS AND OURS 17 (2001) (providing
good analysis of problem); EDWARD SAID, THE POLITICS OF DISPOSSESSION 341-49
(1994) (same); see also REx HUDSON, FED. RES. Drv. OF THE LIBR. OF CONG., WHO
BECOMES A TERRORIST AND WHY: THE 1999 GOVERNMENT REPORT ON PROFILING TERRORISTS (n.d.) (detailing comprehensive report profiling terrorists).

114. Timothy Reuter, Book Note, 22 SAIS REv. 371, 371 (2002) (reviewing
supra note 101).
ESPOSITO, supra note 101; GILLES KEPEL, JIHAD: THE TRAIL OF
115. See, e.g.,
POLITICAL ISLAM (2002); AHMAD RASHID,JIHAD: THE RISE OF MILITANT ISLAM IN CENCARR,
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Muslims have committed several of the recent terrorist attacks, it is inappropriate and unfair to characterize these acts of terrorism as "Islamic terrorism" or "Islamist terrorism."" 6 Most unfortunately, some government
officials, the media and even scholars in this country have repeatedly used
these terms in a loose and insensitive way. The most recent example of
such a misuse of this term is found in the bipartisan 9/11 Commission
Report. 1 17 This line of thinking may have been influenced, at least in
part, by the unfortunate "clash of civilizations" theory posited by such leading scholars as Samuel Huntington" 8 and Bernard Lewis. 119 Both scholars have argued that the growth of an intercivilizational war or conflict
between Islam and the West poses one of the great threats to world peace
and stability.
The more plausible explanation for recent terrorist attacks, including
suicide bombings, is that they have been "used to achieve multiple ends"personal, political and religious.' 20 In many incidents of terrorism, those
groups or individuals who claimed responsibility for these attacks justified
them based on their political or social agenda, as a means of attracting
international attention to their cause and/or to intimidate the governments concerned to change their policies or make concessions. Jessica
Stern, a leading expert on terrorism, confirmed this reading after conducting extensive interviews with religious extremists and terrorists. She
suggests that various factors drive people to terrorism, including political
grievances, feelings of alienation, humiliation, marginalization and exclusion arising from the impact of globalization and capitalism on Muslim
societies. Some Muslims perceive these factors as threats to their Muslim
identity and purity.12 1 In my view, terrorists have repeatedly invoked religTRAL AsIA (2002) (providing noteworthy introduction); see also KAREN ARMSTRONG,
HOLY WARS 40-42 (2d ed. 2001); PETER L. BERGEN, HOLY WAR, INC.: INSIDE THE
SECRET WORLD OF OsAMA BIN LADEN 44 (2001). Armstrong's book is mainly about

the Crusades, which provides a grim reminder that Christians had also engaged in
holy wars in an earlier era.
116. See Atran, Mishandling Suicide Terrorism, supra note 103; Hassan, supra
note 103; Pape, supra note 103.
117. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 362, 364, 374.
118. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CrILIZATIONS: REMAKING OF

THE NEW WORLD ORDER 209-18 (1996).

119. See Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply
Resent the West and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Be Easily Mollified, ATL. MONTHLY,
Sept. 1990, at 17. But seeJOHN L. ESPOSITO, THE ISLAMIC THREAT: MrH OR REAL-

iTY? 172-74 (1992) (providing balanced analysis). Esposito strongly criticizes
Lewis's unduly provocative "roots of rage" analysis as reflecting "the stereotypical
image of Islam and Muslims as menacing militant fundamentalists." Id. at 173.
Esposito also argued that Lewis's analysis "predisposes the reader to view the relationship of Islam to the West in terms of rage, violence, hatred, and irrationality."
Id. at 174. See generally BERNARD LEWIS, WHAT WENT WRONG: WESTERN IMPACT AND
MIDDLE EASTERN RESPONSE (2002) (presenting general historical survey of develop-

ments that have gradually led to increasing conflict between Islam and West).
120. See Hassan, supra note 103, at 1.
121. See generally STERN, supra note 101, particularly 9-62, 281-96.
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ion because history has shown that it is an effective way of rallying support,
stirring up emotions and encouraging violent responses to perceived
injustices.
To sum up, there now exists a substantial body of international law on
combating terrorism. Nevertheless, the absence of universal agreement
on the meaning of "terrorism" and the lack of effective international judicial institutions to prosecute and punish this crime have rendered such a
body of law somewhat weak and thus difficult to implement in practice.
Moreover, as I shall argue later in this Article, the problem of terrorism is
122
not capable of solution by purely legal or military measures.
2.

The Aftermath of September 11

The day after the terrorist attacks, the United Nations Security Council moved swiftly to adopt resolutions strongly condemning this act of terrorism as a "threat to international peace and security." 123 In a
subsequent resolution, Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001, the Security Council reaffirmed its call to all States to sign, ratify and implement the
relevant international conventions criminalizing terrorism and the financing of terrorism. It also stipulated various other legal and financial measures for urgent implementation by States. 124 The Security Council
decided that all States must prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist
acts and criminalize the willful provision or collection of funds by their
nationals to finance terrorist acts. States must also freeze funds and assets
of persons or entities involved with terrorist acts immediately; prohibit nationals and other persons and entities from making funds, financial assets
and economic resources available to those engaged in terrorist activities;
deny safe haven to terrorists; and cooperate closely with other countries in
criminal investigations and proceedings related to such crimes. Additionally, the Security Council also established a Counter Terrorism Committee
to closely monitor implementation by member States of the decisions
under Resolution 1373.
The United States government also took several immediate counterterrorism measures in response to the severe threat posed by the brazen
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in its territory. Bruce Zagaris dis122. See generally Cassese, supra note 111 (providing excellent discussion on
subject of terrorism and international law); Guillaume, supra note 105 (same);
Higgins, supranote 104 (same); PHILIP HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM AND SECURI-IV. WINNING WITHOUT WAR (2004). A former Deputy Attorney General of the
United States and a Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, Heymann is one of
the leading legal scholars on terrorism. See also HEYMANN, TERRORISM IN AMERICA,

supra note 101.
123. Press Release, U.N. Security Council, Security Council Unanimously
Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution: Calls for Suppressing Financing,
Improving International Cooperation (Sept. 28, 2001), available at http://
www.un.org/News/

Press/docs/2001/sc7l58.doc.htm.

124. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., at S/Res/ 1373
(2001), available at www.un.org/docs/scres/2001 /sc2001 /htm.
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cusses these measures in greater detail in his accompanying article 1 25 and
I will, therefore, only provide a brief outline of the initial measures taken.
On September 23, 2001, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13,224 to freeze assets and block transactions in the United States of
any person or institution associated with the terrorists or terrorist organizations designated in the Order. 126 In this Order, the President determined that the "grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism posed by
foreign terrorists," including the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
"constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security,
foreign policy, and economy of the United States." 12 7 President Bush further stated that, "because of the pervasiveness and expansiveness of the
financial foundation of foreign terrorists," financial sanctions may be appropriate for those foreign persons that support or associate with foreign
terrorists. 1 28 The objective was to starve the terrorists of their support
funds. Between September 23, 2001 and December 2004, hundreds of
terrorist organizations, corporate entities, financial institutions, non-profit
organizations, individuals and others have been listed pursuant to this Order and sanctions have subsequently been applied against many of
them.'

29

On October 26, 2001, the President signed into law the USA Patriot
Act of 2001.130 This law significantly expands and strengthens the powers
of United States law enforcement agencies in investigating and prosecuting a variety of crimes related to terrorism, including acts of terrorism,
money laundering and financing activities of terrorist organizations. The
law provides a wider arsenal of weapons to effectively combat terrorism,
including wire-tapping, electronic surveillance, enhanced anti-money
laundering provisions, stronger arrest and*detention powers, seizure and
forfeiture powers and enhanced immigration provisions and border
controls.
The United Nations Security Council compiled and issued its own
consolidated list of terrorists and terrorist organizations pursuant to Secur125. See Bruce Zagaris, Revisiting Novel Approaches to Combating the Financingof
Crime: A Brave New World Revisited, 50 VILL. L. REv. 509 (2005).
126. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. The United States list is available on the U.S. Treasury, Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) website at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/ sanctions/terrorism.html. For additional prohibited lists of terrorists and terrorist organizations prepared for such purposes as immigration
control and security, see the U.S. Department of State website at http://
www.state.gov.
130. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31,
42, 49, 50 U.S.C.).
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ity Council Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000) and 1390 (2002), 131 as
have a number of other European States and the European Union. Several States have also established their own similar lists. The problem for
international law enforcement is that there are significant variations between these various lists of terrorists and terrorist organizations, thereby
creating practical barriers to facilitating international cooperation and
mutual assistance between jurisdictions.
The FATF held an Extraordinary Plenary meeting in Washington,
D.C. on October 29-30, 2001. At the meeting, the FATF adopted an international action plan consisting of eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing ("FATF Eight").1 32 The recommendations call on all
States to take urgent action under the relevant international anti-terrorism
conventions and their national laws to counter the financing of
33

terrorism. 1
3.

The Financingof Terrorism

International concern with the problem of the financing of terrorism
was heightened after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. While
there had always been some suspicion that secret and fictitious bank accounts were being used to fund terrorist activities, investigations conducted after the attacks, primarily in the United States, Europe, the
Middle East and Asia, revealed the existence of an extensive network of
underground banking and other financing channels that have been used
to finance terrorist activities. This foundation manifests itself in numerous

accounts opened and operated using the fronts of business enterprisessuch as honey centres and sweet bakeries-charities, religious groups, hospitals, orphanages, trusts, educational and research institutes, political associations and students' organizations. Many of these accounts are held in
banks in the Middle East, Europe and the United States, but also in less
conspicuous financial institutions such as offshore financial centres
elsewhere.

134

As noted earlier, the international treaty criminalizing the financing
of terrorism is the Terrorism Financing Convention. 135 This Convention
requires States Parties to take steps to criminalize the financing of ter131. The United Nations Security Council has adopted a list of terrorists and
terrorist organizations that is somewhat different from the United States' list. The
United Nations' list is available at http://www.un.org/Docs/SC/committees/
1267/1267ListEng.html.
132. See FATF, Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (Oct. 31, 2001),

available at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/SRecTF-en.pdf [hereinafter FATF
Eight]. For further discussion of these recommendations, see infra note 139 and
accompanying text.
133. See FATF Eight, supra note 132.
134. See JAMEs ADAMS, THE FINANCING OF TERROR (1986) (discussing sources
and techniques of financing terrorism).
135. See Terrorism Financing Convention, supra note 107.
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rorists, terrorist organizations and terrorist acts. To this end, Article 2.1 of
the Convention defines the "financing of terrorism" as follows:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention
that they should be used or in knowledge that they are to be
used, in full or in part, in order to carry out [acts of terrorism as
1 36
defined in the Convention].
State Parties are required to apply criminal, civil or administrative sanctions against those persons held liable for such acts. The Convention
came into force on April 10, 2002.
As this Convention has yet to be ratified by many signatory States,
Resolution 1373 provides the primary legal basis for requiring all member
countries of the United Nations to take concrete steps immediately to suppress terrorism and terrorist financing. This is because a Security Council
Resolution taken in response to a threat to international peace and security, pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, is a decision
that is legally binding on all members.
In examining the financial foundation for terrorism as revealed in
part by the investigations following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, it is important to distinguish between two separate and distinct types
of terrorist financing-financing through money laundering and financing through the use of legitimate funds.
With regard to the first type, money laundering, various published
reports have suggested that a significant part of the financing for the terrorists operating in and outside Afghanistan came from plying the drug
trade. In 2000, Afghanistan was the largest producer of opium poppy in
the world with an estimated production of about 3,600 metric tons. Production decreased significantly in 2001 due to a ban on such production
imposed by the Taliban regime,' 37 but the most recent international and
United States surveys indicate that in 2003, opium production increased
substantially and Afghanistan once again produced three-quarters of the
world's illicit opium. 1 38 The proceeds from the sale of drugs have been

laundered and used to finance the activities of terrorists. Such financing
of terrorism using criminal proceeds would be caught by the provisions of
most national anti-money laundering laws and by the FATF Forty.
The second type of financing for terrorism-the use of legitimate
funds-appears to be a phenomenon of more recent vintage. This type of
136. Id. For the definition of acts of terrorism under this Convention, see
supra footnote 109 and accompanying text.
137. For information on drug production, see the United States State Depart-

ment website located at http://www.state.gov.
138. See Bureau for Int'l Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Mar. 2004),
www.state.gov/

available at http://

g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/.
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financing involves the use or abuse of seemingly legitimate bank accounts
to finance criminal activities, including terrorism, with or without the
knowledge of the donors or contributors of such funds. The most obvious
example of this is the use of non-profit organizations such as charities.
The issue has been highlighted most starkly by the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks. The problem posed here was that the use of legitimate
funds to finance crime did not fall within the original mandate of the
FATF until October 2001 or the purview of most national anti-money laundering laws.
With the gradual decline (at least officially) of support from certain
rogue States for terrorist activities, it has become increasingly clear that
public or private financing is an important lifeline of support for terrorism. It is widely believed that much of the funding for terrorist activities
has come from donations made by wealthy individuals and organizations
to various Islamic causes or projects. Pinning down the culprits of terrorist
financing is problematic, however, when viewed in the context of Middle
East culture and Islamic values. This is true for at least two reasons. First,
the Koran imposes an obligation on all Muslims to contribute a portion of
their wealth, called zakat, to religious charities. Second, there is growing
support for Islamic movements that promote political, social and cultural
causes. The poor and those clamoring for political reforms in Middle East
countries are among those who seek salvation through support for Islamic
causes.
While many wealthy individuals and organizations in the Persian Gulf
States have contributed generously to various non-profit organizations including charities, some have argued there was no way for them to know or
ensure that such funds were actually used for the stated charitable purposes or were diverted to finance terrorism. A principal reason for this
problem is obviously the lack of effective legal systems that impose strict
rules of transparency, accounting and auditing requirements, including
periodic statutory reporting on the actual use of such funds. Weak prudential or corporate supervisory regimes in some Middle East countries
also contribute to the problem. In Afghanistan for example, there was no
formal financial system to speak of, let alone prudential regulation.
At the FATF Emergency Plenary meeting on October 29-30, 2001, an
international action plan was adopted to crack down immediately on terrorist financing. This action plan took the form of the FATF Eight, which
called on all countries to:
(1) ratify and implement the Terrorism Financing Convention,
and also to implement the relevant United Nations Resolutions
relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of
terrorist acts, particularly Security Council Resolution 1373;
(2) criminalize the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organizations, and designate such offences as predicate offences for money laundering;
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss3/5
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(3) freeze without delay the funds or other assets of terrorists,
financiers of terrorism and terrorist organizations, and also to
adopt and implement measures to seize and confiscate terrorist
assets;
(4) require financial institutions, or other businesses and entities
subject to anti-money laundering obligations, to promptly report
suspicious transactions related to terrorism;
(5) extend the greatest possible measure of assistance to other
countries in connection with criminal, civil enforcement, and administrative investigations, inquiries and proceedings relating to
the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist
organizations;
(6) require that alternative remittance systems (i.e., persons or
legal entities, including agents, that provide a service for the
transmission of money or value) be licensed or registered as financial institutions and subject to FATF Forty that apply to banks
and non-bank financial institutions;
(7) require financial institutions, including money remitters, to
strengthen customer identification procedures for wire transfers
by obtaining more accurate and meaningful originator information; and
(8) review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to
non-profit organizations, which are particularly vulnerable, to en13 9
sure that they cannot be misused to finance terrorism.
As the FATF has a very limited membership and can only make recommendations to its members and invite non-members to adhere to these
recommendations, FATF has relied explicitly on Resolution 1373 as the
legal basis for FATF Eight.
Notably, most of the recommendations under FATF Eight actually
mirror the recommendations on money laundering contained in FATF
Forty. In April 2002, the FATF issued more detailed guidelines to assist
financial institutions in detecting terrorist financing. The guidelines cover
such matters as the risks posed to financial institutions, reinforcing existing requirements, determining when increased scrutiny is necessary and
identifying some of the main characteristics of terrorist financing. These
characteristics include the sources of such funds and the methods used to
launder those funds. 140 In April 2002, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision issued guidelines for banks regarding sharing financial
14 1
records between jurisdictions to combat the financing of terrorism.
139. FATF Eight, supra note 132.
140. See FATF, Guidancefor FinancialInstitutions in Detecting TerroristFinancing
(Apr. 24, 2002), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pdf/GuidFITFOI-en.pdf.
141. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Sharing of FinancialRecords Between Jurisdictions in Connection with the Fight Against TerroristFinancing(Apr. 2002),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs89.pdf.
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On October 20-22, 2004, the FATF added a ninth special recommendation to strengthen the international community's counter-terrorist financing defences. The new Special Recommendation Nine calls on
countries to implement measures to detect and stop the physical crossborder transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments that
are suspected to be related to terrorist financing and money laundering
42
and to confiscate such currency or instruments.1
C.

43

Corruption'

Corruption is commonly defined as the misuse of public office or
power for gain. For many years, the term "corruption" has been understood to refer to the promise, offering or giving to, or the solicitation or
acceptance by, a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her
officials duties. 144 In more recent years, however, the term "corruption"
has increasingly referred to a category of activities much wider than just
the bribery of public officials.
Accordingly, the new Corruption Convention does not use a single
definition of "corruption." 145 Instead, the Convention indirectly defines
corruption by including detailed provisions that criminalize the following
142. See FAFT Eight, supra note 132, at Recommendation IX.
143. There are numerous books and articles on corruption but the following
represent some of the best publications available. SeeJOHN NOONAN, BRIBES (1984)
(early classic work on bribes); see also ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING
CORRUPTION (1988); and ROBERT KLITGAARD, CORRUPT CITIES (2002). The writings
of Klitgaard are particularly interesting and valuable because they are leavened by
his extensive field experience working in Africa and Latin America. Currently the
Dean and Ford Distinguished Professor of International Development and
Security at the RAND Graduate School in Santa Monica, California, he has served
for many years as a consultant to the World Bank and several foreign governments
in developing anti-corruption policies and strategies. See also SUSAN ROSEACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND REFORM
(1999); POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS & CONTEXT (ArnoldJ. Heidenheimer &
Michael Johnston eds., 3d ed. 2000); OECD, No LONGER BUSINESS As USUAL:
FIGHTING BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION (2000); Cheryl Gray & Daniel Kaufman,
Corruption and Development, FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, Mar. 1998, at 7.

144. See Corruption Convention, supra note 18, (criminalizing bribery of national public officials, one of several corruption offences established by Convention); Palermo Convention, supra note 22 (adopting similar language in narrower
definition of corruption used in Article 8, paragraph 1 of Palermo Convention);
OECD, Convention on CombatingBribery of Foreign Public Officials in InternationalBusiness Transactions (Nov. 21, 1997) [hereinafter Convention on Combating Bribery],
at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1997doc.nsf/ 43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d00
4c/5005eebd0c0be05880256754005d2ba0/$FILE/04E81240.DOC (adopting similar language in Article 1); see also KLITGAARD, CORRUPT CITIES, supra note 143, at 14; THE WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 16 (1992).
145. See Corruption Convention, supra note 18 (avoiding adoption of single
definition of corruption).
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acts as corruption offences: (1) bribery of national public officials;

146

(2)

bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public international organizations;' 47 (3) embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of
property by a public official; 148 (4) trading in influence to obtain an undue advantage for any person; 149 (5) abuse of functions to obtain an undue advantage; 150 (6) illicit enrichment; 1 5 1 (7) bribery in the private
sector;' 5 2 (8) embezzlement of property in the private sector; 1 53 (9) laundering of the proceeds of crime; 154 (10) concealment or continued reten-

tion of proceeds from the commission of offences established by the
Convention; 155 and (11) obstruction of justice during law enforcement
efforts to prosecute such offences. 156 In light of this wider understanding
of "corruption," a broader definition, such as the one put forward by
Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen is more appropriate. Sen
states that "[c] orruption involves the violation of established rules for personal gain or profit."

157

It is particularly significant to note that one of the most important
substantive provisions of this Convention is Article 14, which requires each
State Party to implement comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory measures to combat money laundering. The importance and prominence given to this provision on money laundering is clear because of the
concern expressed by the State Parties in the Preamble "about the links
between corruption and other forms of crime, in particular organized
crime and economic crime, including money laundering."1 58 In calling
on State Parties to implement this provision, the Convention recommends
that they "use as a guideline the relevant initiatives of regional, interre159
gional and multilateral organizations against money laundering."
The Corruption Convention also includes detailed provisions concerning the application of sanctions for corruption offences established
under the Convention that take into account the gravity of the offence;
freezing, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds derived from such offences or of property, equipment or other instrumentalities used in or
destined for use in such offences; protection of witnesses, experts and victims; protection of reporting persons; dealing with the consequences of
146. Id. art. 15.
147. Id. art. 16.
148. Id. art. 17.

149. Id. art. 18.
150. Id. art. 19.

151. Id. art. 20.
152. Id. art. 21.
153. Id. art. 22.
154. Id. arts. 15, 23.

155. Id. art. 24.
156. Id. art. 25.
157. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT

AS FREEDOM 275 (1999).
158. Corruption Convention, supra note 18, at Preamble,

159. Id. art. 14,

2.

4.
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corruption such as annulling or rescinding contracts or withdrawing concessions or other similar advantages awarded through corruption and taking other remedial action; compensation for damage suffered as a result
of corruption; overcoming bank secrecy rules; cooperation between national authorities and between such authorities and the private sector; international cooperation and mutual assistance measures; and asset
recovery. These provisions are substantially similar to or consistent with
those included in other international criminal law conventions such as the
Vienna Convention and the Palermo Convention, and also in FATF Forty.
Before leaving the subject of the Corruption Convention, it should be
noted that there have been several earlier international and regional conventions aimed at preventing and combating corruption. These conventions include the following: the Inter-American Convention against
Corruption,' 6 0 adopted by the OAS in 1996; the Convention on the Fight
Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or
Officials of Member States of the European Union, 161 adopted by the
Council of the European Union in 1997; the Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 1 6 2 adopted by the OECD in 1997; the Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption and the Civil Law Convention on Corruption, 1 63 adopted by
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 1999; and the
64
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption,'

adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the African Union in
2003.165
Today, it is widely accepted that poor governance, including corruption in particular, has the most pernicious effects on development. The
following words from Amartya Sen are particularly instructive:
The prevalence of corruption is rightly regarded as one of the
major stumbling blocks in the path to successful economic progress, for example in many Asian and African countries. A high
160. Office of Inter-American Law and Programs, Inter-American Convention on
American Corruption (Mar. 29, 1996), at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-58.html
161. Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the
European Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union,
1997 OJ. (C 195/1), available at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvbi
133027.htm (last updated Aug. 8, 2002).
162. Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 144.
163. Council of Europe, The Civil Law Convention on Corruption (Nov. 4, 1999),
at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/174.htm; see also Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Jan. 27, 1999), at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/ EN/Treaties/Html/173.htm.
164. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption
(July 11, 2003), at http://www.africa-union.org/Officialdocuments/Treaties
-%20Conventions-%20Protocols/
Convention%20on%20Combating%20Corruption.pdf.
165. See Corruption Convention, supra note 18, at Preamble.
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level of corruption can make public policies ineffective and can
also draw investment and economic activities away from productive pursuits towards the towering rewards of underhanded activities. It can also lead... to the fostering of violent organizationssuch as
1 66

the Mafia.

In a similar vein, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, on the
occasion of the adoption of the Corruption Convention, declared:
Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on societies. It undermines democracy and the rule of law,
leads to violation of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life, and allows organized crime, terrorism and other threats to
16 7
flourish.
The FATF has addressed the issue of corruption and its link to money
laundering in the revised FATF Forty issued in June 2003. As noted earlier, a new recommendation has been added which calls on financial institutions to exercise enhanced customer due diligence measures in relation
to PEPs. 168 PEPs are defined as follows:
[I]ndividuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent
public functions in a foreign country, for example Heads of State
or of government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial
or military officials, senior executives of state-owned corpora169
tions, important political party officials.
This provision was included in view of growing concerns over corruption
and abuse of public funds by government leaders and public sector officials in many countries. The high profile investigations of former Presidents Sani Abacha of Nigeria, Suharto of Indonesia, Ferdinand Marcos
and Joseph Estrada of the Philippines, and Intelligence Chief Vladimiro
Montesinos of Peru demonstrated how enormous amounts of illegal
wealth acquired by corrupt leaders and senior government officials have
been transferred to foreign jurisdictions and concealed through private
companies, trusts or foundations or under the names of relatives or close
associates of the PEPs. Accordingly, the new Recommendation 6 requires
financial institutions to:
a) have appropriate risk management systems to determine
whether the customer is a politically exposed person;
b) obtain senior management approval for establishing business
relationships with such customers;
166. SEN, supra note 157, at 275 (emphasis added).
167. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Statement on the Adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (Oct. 31, 2003) (emphasis added).
168. FATF Forty, supra note 25, at Recommendation 6.
169. Id. at Glossary (defining "politically exposed persons").
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c) take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth
and source of funds; and
d) conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business
relationship. '

70

This important new provision in FATF Forty, taken together with the adoption of the landmark Corruption Convention, clearly demonstrates the international community's determination to stamp out corruption in all its
forms worldwide.
It is important to note here that the widespread prevalence of corruption throughout the world, both in developing and developed countries,
stands as a major obstacle to combating other international crimes such as
money laundering, terrorism, smuggling, drug trafficking and white slavery. There is a growing body of evidence that has built up over the years,
particularly from the jurisprudence of many national courts, including the
United States and several European States, that organized crime syndicates and individual criminals, including money launderers, have been
able to buy immunity from detection and prosecution through the payment of large bribes to politicians, law enforcement officials and officers
in financial institutions and financial supervisory agencies. Therefore, unless and until this fundamental underlying problem of corruption is attacked and reduced (if not eliminated), the prospects for winning the war
against international crime are not good.
IV.

SOME IMPEDIMENTS TO WINNING THE WAR AGAINST

INTERNATIONAL CRIME

A number of factors severely complicates and frustrates the national
and international law enforcement agencies' efforts to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute the crimes of money laundering, financing of terrorism and corruption. The first complicating factor is a set of
developments that may be characterized as the changing typologies of international crime. These impediments, however, lend themselves more
readily to solution by amendment of national laws, changes in law enforcement strategies and better international cooperation. The second factor is
poor implementation or difficulties in implementing international and national laws and standards at the national level. The final factor is the conflicting policies and strategies adopted by the United States to fight
international crime, especially terrorism. These factors are discussed
below.
A.

Changing Typologies of InternationalCrime

First, it is important to appreciate that the defining characteristic of
the three crimes under discussion is the rapid movement of money or
value between jurisdictions. The cross-border characteristics of such
170. Id. at Recommendation 6.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss3/5
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crimes dictate that they cannot be solved without effective international
cooperation and mutual assistance between the jurisdictions involved. As
the strategy of the criminal is to de-link the proceeds of the crime from
the crimes and criminals, money launderers typically move the proceeds
to ajurisdiction with weaker laws and law enforcement regimes. This practice has sometimes been referred to as "regulatory arbitrage." Frequently,
the proceeds of the crime, and sometimes also the criminal, have left the
jurisdiction by the time the crime has been reported to the national law
enforcement authorities. Unfortunately, effective international cooperation and mutual assistance arrangements between jurisdictions are few
and far between. In the absence of such arrangements, it is usually very
difficult for the law enforcement authorities from the requesting jurisdiction to secure effective cooperation and assistance from the other jurisdictions involved, such as when the request involves the collection of
evidence, the freezing and seizure of the proceeds of the crime and extradition of the criminal.
Second, as legal measures and law enforcement efforts worldwide
continue to tighten the noose around money launderers, terrorists and
corrupt public officials, criminals have shown remarkable determination
and ingenuity in devising new methods and schemes to launder criminal
proceeds or finance terrorist activities over and above the traditional laundering techniques using the formal banking system. Money laundering
studies carried out by the FATF in recent years have identified several of
these new techniques. 1 7 ' Some of these new techniques are difficult to
detect and present law enforcement authorities with new challenges in collecting and presenting evidence to prosecute the crimes. The following
sections provide some examples of these techniques.
1.

Using Informal Financing Channels or Alternative Remittance Systems

As noted earlier, investigations since the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks revealed the existence of a pervasive international financial network outside the formal banking system that allowed terrorists and terrorist organizations to transfer funds surreptitiously to finance terrorist
activities around the world. These investigations showed that a substantial
part of the financing for terrorism was transferred through informal financing channels or alternative remittance systems. One good example of
this is the hawala system-meaning "in trust," in Hindi-which is used
mainly in India, Pakistan and the Middle East to transfer money or value
across borders without involving any physical movement of the money or
any paperwork. These transactions escape the usual bank scrutiny
through customer due diligence, oversight by financial regulators and
171. For a detailed discussion of the money laundering trends and typologies
discussed in this section, see FATF Annual Reports (2000-01, 2001-02 and 2002-03)

located at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/findDocument/0,2350,en_32250379-322372
3513247548111,0 O.html.
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monitoring by law enforcement authorities. Hawala brokers, known as
hawaladars, usually work out of small storefront operations. The hawala
system works in the following way. A Pakistani living in Baltimore approaches a hawaladarin Baltimore with a request to transfer $5,000 to his

brother in Karachi, Pakistan. He negotiates a service fee and the exchange rate, and then delivers $5,000 in cash plus the fee to the hawaladar.
This hawaladar immediately instructs, usually by telephone, another
hawaladarin Karachi to deliver the rupee equivalent of the funds to the
brother under a pre-arranged code, usually a set of numbers. The transaction takes one to two days, which is faster than most bank wire transfers.
The whole transaction is consummated without leaving a paper trail.
There is no opening of accounts and no maintenance of records. While
this informal system is widely used for transfers of legitimate funds, such as
remittances by overseas workers to their families at home, it is also believed to be one of the key channels for money laundering and the financing of terrorism because of the anonymity that it provides.
Informal financing channels or alternative remittance systems also operate in China and East Asia. This system is based on the use of "chits" or
"tokens" and is, therefore, often referred to as the "chit system." It has
spread to other parts of the world through immigration. In the Western
Hemisphere, the Black Market Peso Exchange has been used to support
both legitimate trade and smuggling between North and South America.
These two systems operate very much like the hawala system, and involve
the use of a local remittance service and a sister company overseas. Variations of these alternative remittance systems also exist in Europe and
1 72
Africa.
The FATF response to this problem was Special Recommendation Six
of FATF Eight, which stipulates that:
Each country should take measures to ensure that persons or legal entities, including agents, that provide a service for the transmission of money or value, including transmission through an
informal money or value transfer system or network, should be
licensed or registered and subject to all the FATF Recommendations that apply to banks and non-bank financial institutions.
Each Country should ensure that persons or legal entities that
carry out this service illegally are subject to administrative, civil or
173
criminal sanctions.
When FATF Forty was revised and reissued in June 2003, the definition of "financial institutions" was broadened to include any person or
entity that conducts as a business "the transfer of money or value" for or
172. See Lisa C. Carroll, Alternative Remittance Systems: DistinguishingSub-Systems
of Ethnic Money Laundering in Interpol Member Countries on the Asian Continent,
at http://www.interpol.int/public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/Ethnic
Money/default.asp (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
173. FATF Eight, supra note 132, at Special Recommendation 6.
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on behalf of a customer.17
that provides:

4

FATF then included a new recommendation

At a minimum, businesses providing a service of money or value
transfer ...

should be licensed or registered, and subject to ef-

fective systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance with national requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist
75
financing.

1

While the rules with respect to alternative remittance systems have been
tightened, it is doubtful that most of the entities that operate such systems
will come out into the open now and license or register themselves as financial institutions. The reason is that their most attractive feature has
been the secrecy of their modus operandi. They are likely to see no benefit in transforming themselves to regular financial institutions subject to
regulatory oversight. In fact, they would be particularly reluctant to assume the burden of exercising customer due diligence, reporting suspicious transactions and record keeping. Moreover, the risks-reward
premium for such clandestine money or value transmission services has
increased in their favour since September 11, 2001.
2.

PurchasingInsurance Policies, Bearer Bonds and Other Negotiable Financial
Instruments

There is growing evidence that criminals are using their criminal proceeds to purchase financial products and instruments from non-bank financial institutions, investments advisers and brokers to bypass the banks
and the banking regulators. They do this by purchasing bearer bonds in
the international capital markets in order to hold such bonds anonymously and outside the detection of financial regulators or law enforcement officials. Similarly, criminals also purchase life insurance policies by
paying high upfront premiums and negotiating early cancellation or redemption provisions. The securities and insurance sectors are particularly
vulnerable to abuse of money laundering and the financing of terrorism
because, until very recently, insurance companies and securities firms, brokers, agents and investment advisers were not subject to the same rigorous
oversight by national financial regulatory bodies as banks were even
though the previous FATF Forty issued in 1996 indicated that its recommendations should also apply to non-bank financial institutions.
The latest FATF Forty, as revised and reissued in June 2003, now
makes it more explicit, through an expanded definition of "financial institutions," that non-bank financial institutions such as insurance companies,
securities firms, their brokers and agents are subject to the anti-money
174. FATF Forty, supranote 25, at Glossary (defining "financial institutions").
175. Id. at Recommendation 23; see also FATF, Combatingthe Abuse of Alternative
Remittance Systems: International Best Practices (June 20, 2003), at http://www.fatf-

gafi.org/pdf/SR6-BPP-en.pdf.
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laundering and anti-terrorist financing recommendations in the same way
as banks. As noted earlier, IOSCO and JAIS have issued guidelines to
their respective sectors to combat money laundering and the financing 1of
76
terrorism. The LAIS, in particular, has issued very detailed guidelines.
3.

Using Special Corporate Vehicles

Criminals have also used the cover of various corporate vehicles such
as international business corporations, shell companies, offshore entities
including offshore banks, trusts and nominee companies to launder their
criminal proceeds. Many of these entities are licensed and registered in
small island jurisdictions in the South Pacific but maintain offices and
carry out their activities in other countries. These entities are generally
not subject to any ongoing national regulation or supervision. Therefore,
the transactions that these entities enter into are shrouded in considerable
secrecy, which allows their clients to establish accounts and transfer funds
using proxies, nominees, trustees and agents without disclosing the true
beneficial owners. These entities also do not always record their financial
transactions, submit financial statements or audits to the regulators and
frequently are not even required by the governing law of the countries of
incorporation or registration to disclose information to regulators and law
enforcement officials.
The latest FATF Forty includes a number of provisions to deal with
this problem. These measures include requiring financial institutions to
considerably strengthen the due diligence requirements for verifying the
identity of their customers, particularly the true beneficial owners of accounts; 1 7 7 extending the application of such requirements and recordkeeping and reporting of suspicious transactions requirements to lawyers,
accountants and trust and company service providers; 178 and closely scrutinizing the transactions of PEPs. 1 79 Countries are urged not to approve
the establishment or continued operation of shell banks. Financial institutions are asked not to enter into or continue correspondent banking relationships with shell banks or foreign financial institutions that permit their
accounts to be used by shell banks; 180 to give special attention to business
relationships and transactions with persons, companies and financial insti18 1
tutions from countries that do not or insufficiently apply FATF Forty;
and to ensure that their branches and majority-owned subsidiaries located
abroad apply FATF Forty, especially in countries that do not or insuffi82

1
ciently apply FATF Forty.

176. For a discussion of IAIS guidelines, see supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
177. FATF Forty, supra note 25, at Recommendation 5.
178. Id. at Recommendations 12, 16.
179. Id. at Recommendation 6.
180. Id. at Recommendation 18.
181. Id. at Recommendation 21.
182. Id. at Recommendation 22.
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Using Non-Profit Bodies Such As Charities and Foundations

The September 11, 2001 investigations revealed that, in addition to
using informal financing channels or alternative remittance systems, the
terrorists used several non-profit bodies such as charities and foundations
in the Middle East, the United States and Europe to raise funds for terrorist activities. They then used the same non-profit bodies to transfer the
funds to other persons and jurisdictions to finance terrorist activities. In
some cases, the non-profit body was a mere sham that was set up simply as
a cover to funnel money to terrorists. Many of these non-profit bodies,
however, were established for purposes related to education, religion,
community service, helping the poor, women and children, health care
promotion and social advancement. The evidence gathered in the investigations revealed that funds legitimately raised by several of these nonprofit bodies were then secretly diverted to terrorists and terrorist organizations to finance terrorist activities, either with or without the knowledge
of the donors or the management of these bodies. Non-profit bodies were
especially attractive because, in most cases and particularly in the Middle
East, they were not subject to close supervision by financial regulators and
were tax-exempt, thus also avoiding the notice of the tax authorities.
The FATF response to this problem was Special Recommendation
Eight of FATF Eight, which called on countries to "review the adequacy of
laws and regulations that relate to entities that can be abused for the financing of terrorism." 1 83 Non-profit organizations were identified as particularly vulnerable to such misuse. Therefore, countries were urged to
ensure that these organizations "cannot be misused: (i) by terrorist organizations posing as legitimate entities; (ii) to exploit legitimate entities as
conduits for terrorist financing, including for the purpose of escaping asset freezing measures; and (iii) to conceal or obstruct the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes to terrorist
organizations."1 8 4 More detailed guidance notes were issued later by
FATF to assist countries in taking the required measures to closely monitor
185
the activities of their non-profit organizations.
5.

Using "Gatekeepers" to Structure Special FinancialTransactions and
Corporate Vehicles

The most recent FATF studies have highlighted the problem that, as
the risk of detection becomes greater under the banking system, money
launderers have increasingly sought the advice or services of specialized
professionals to facilitate their financial operations. These professionals
include various legal experts such as solicitors, notaries and other independent legal professionals and financial experts such as accountants and
183. FAFT Eight, supra note 132, at Special Recommendation 8.
184. Id.
185. FATF, Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organizations: International Best
Practices (Oct. 11, 2003), at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pdf/SR8-NPO-en.pdf.
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1 86
investment advisers, who are generally referred to as "gatekeepers."
These experts provide advice to individuals and businesses on such matters as investment, company formation, setting up special corporate vehicles, trusts and other legal arrangements and tax optimization. In
addition, they are also frequently involved in executing various types of
financial transactions, including the purchase of real estate or securities.
Gatekeepers offer the cover of legitimacy for such transactions, serving as
intermediaries in dealing with financial institutions. Most importantly, accountants, financial advisers and lawyers are generally protected by client
confidentiality or professional privilege provisions.
The latest FATF Forty has addressed the issue of gatekeepers by calling on financial institutions to apply the same customer due diligence and
record-keeping requirements to a new group of "designated non-financial
businesses and professions" in certain specified situations. These requirements will apply to gatekeepers when they prepare for, engage in or carry
out transactions for their clients in buying or selling real estate; managing
client money, securities or other assets; managing bank, savings or securi-

ties accounts; organizing of contributions for the creation, operation or

management of companies; creation, operation or management of legal
18 7
persons or arrangements; and buying and selling of business entities.
Similarly, the requirement for the reporting of suspicious transactions will
also apply to gatekeepers when they engage in one of the transactions described above on behalf of their clients. When these gatekeepers are acting as independent professionals, however, they are not required to report
their suspicions if the relevant information was obtained in circumstances
where they are subject to professional secrecy or legal professional privilege.18 8 The formulation of this particular recommendation is not a
model of clarity because it does not provide precise guidelines on how to

draw the line between the two types of functions. As a practical matter, it
is very difficult to know how or where to draw this line in many cases, thus
exposing the gatekeeper professionals to potential criminal or civil liability. The recommendation has also aroused controversy and objections
from some bar associations and professional bodies. Time will tell how
well this recommendation can or will be implemented in practice.

186. FATF, Report on Money Launderingand TerroristFinancing Typologies 20032004, 23-26 (2004), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/19/11/
33624379.PDF (describing how independent professionals, experts and their associates often act as middlemen in illegal financial transactions); see also FATF, Report
on Money Laundering Typologies 2000-2001, 12-15 (2001), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/36/34038090.pdf [hereinafter Money Laundering]
(same).
187. See FATF Forty, supra note 25, at Recommendation 12.
188. See id. at Recommendation 16.
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Use of Electronic Non-Face-to-FaceFinancial Transactions

The great benefits of information technology, including the ease and
speed with which financial transfers can be executed, are 2ilso available to
the money launderer, corrupt public official and terrorist. In recent years,
growing concern has been expressed about the vulnerabilities that the Internet might offer for the laundering of criminal proceeds. The range of
financial services that could be carried out over the Internet include direct
payment, electronic funds transfer, issue of checks, purchase of securities
and opening and closing of accounts. Many financial institutions now offer online banking facilities to their customers. This poses new challenges
for implementing customer identification and suspicious transactions reporting requirements because the customer can initiate and complete
such transactions with minimum scrutiny. Another emerging area of concern is the use of the Internet for gambling. Virtual casinos are being
used by organized crime groups in a number of jurisdictions to launder
their criminal proceeds. 189
This problem is still being studied by the FATF. The delay in developing any new recommendations to deal with this problem is due primarily
to the lack of sufficient examples of this abuse. Moreover, given the absence of any clearly-established guidelines as to which law applies to
borderless Internet transactions and which jurisdictions have primary responsibility for detecting and punishing such crimes, the task of formulating recommendations is more complex.
B.

Poor Implementation or Difficulties in Implementation at the National Level

The earlier discussion has shown that there is now a formidable body
of international treaty law and a corpus of other international standards,
codes and best practices that provide very explicit guidance to countries,
financial institutions and other relevant persons on the adoption and implementation of measures to combat money laundering, terrorism and the
financing of terrorism and corruption. The evidence indicates that the
majority of countries in the world have taken a variety of legal measures to
implement this new international legal regime within their own national
jurisdictions-particularly in the area of anti-money laundering and combating terrorism and the financing of terrorism-through the promulgation of new legislation and regulations. It is still too early to assess the
quality of compliance with the new Corruption Convention, which was
only signed in December 2003. While the adoption of new laws and regulations is a positive and necessary first step towards establishing a sound
legal regime, the real test of their effectiveness is how well they are actually
enforced in practice. With respect to anti-money laundering and combating terrorism and the financing of terrorism, the quality of compliance by
countries and financial institutions with substantive rules has been some189. See FATF, Money Laundering, supra note 186, at 2-8 (discussing some ex-

amples of Internet-based financial transactions).
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what disappointing. There are several reasons for this and a few of the
more important ones are discussed below.
First, the disparities in the legal provisions of national laws between
different jurisdictions pose serious practical problems for law enforcement. Material differences in legal provisions include matters such as the
scope of the offence (e.g., in the case of money laundering, differences in
the number of predicate offences and, in the case of terrorism and the
financing of terrorism, how "terrorism" is defined), the extent to which
bank secrecy laws apply, whether liabilities are also placed on legal persons
and corporate management and the nature of the penalties. One unfortunate consequence of such disparity in laws is that it provides an opportunity for criminals to engage in regulatory arbitrage. Another consequence
is that cooperation between law enforcement officials and financial regulatory agencies becomes more complex and problematic where the national
law provisions in the two jurisdictions are materially different. The problem here is not dissimilar from the one usually experienced in extradition
cases.
Second, a major obstacle to successful law enforcement in many developing and transition countries is the weakness of the institutions responsible for enforcing the laws. This is particularly true, for example, in
the small Pacific islands such as the Cook Islands, Samoa and Marshall
Islands where only one or two officials constitute the entire institutional
machinery to enforce the laws against anti-money laundering and the financing of terrorism. In the case of many developing and transition countries, there is the added problem of ill-equipped agencies and staff who
are not trained in the prevention, detection or prosecution of sophisticated international crimes. The investigating and unraveling of these
crimes call for the highest forensic and financial intelligence expertise,
which is seriously lacking in most developing and transition countries.
Even with the availability of such skills in developed countries like the
United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, it usually
takes as long as three to four years of painstaking investigations, carried
out in several jurisdictions, before a money laundering or corruption case
can be unraveled and solved.
Third, the cost of compliance is very high for many developing and
transition countries. The high cost is due to the need to allocate substantial human, financial and technical resources and institutional arrangements to implement the laws and regulations effectively. With extremely
limited financial resources at their disposal for developmental needs, governments have to balance their priorities carefully and make sure that
their other needs for food, health care, education and social services are
not jeopardized by a disproportionate allocation of resources to fighting
international crime. It is also important to appreciate that many of these
countries do not see terrorism as significant a threat to their security as the
United States does, even though money laundering and corruption could
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss3/5
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threaten the integrity of their financial systems. Finally, because the cost
of compliance is so high, developed countries would need to provide
much more financial and technical assistance than they currently do to
help developing and transition countries to effectively implement their
laws against international crime. Some assistance is currently being provided under various bilateral aid programs and through international financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank. These organizations have projects designed to assist
such countries establish the required legal regimes and by training their
financial regulatory and law enforcement officials.
Fourth, the lack of political will in several countries to enforce the
laws is another serious problem. Widespread corruption among senior political leaders, financial regulators and law enforcement officials in these
countries is a major factor. The latest FATF Forty has addressed this problem by calling on financial institutions to exercise enhanced customer due
diligence on PEPs. It is particularly delicate and difficult, however, for the
staff of financial institutions to apply strict customer due diligence requirements to their PEPs.
Fifth, the increasing use of electronic non-face-to-face financial services such as online banking, Internet gambling or casinos, telephone
banking, ATMs, credit cards, smart cards and electronic purses will also
continue to pose serious obstacles to the strict enforcement of customer
identification/"know your customer" procedures and reporting of suspicious transactions until some solution to this problem is found through
international agreement on how such transactions are to be regulated and
by whom.
Sixth, the injection of religion and politics into the money laundering, terrorism and financing of terrorism equation has made it much
more difficult to secure an effective global, political and legal consensus
and unified strategy to combat these crimes. In the absence of a real political and legal consensus, international law enforcement efforts to secure
close cooperation between jurisdictions will become much more difficult.
In the past, several countries have complained that their efforts to
combat international crime have been severely hampered by the lack of
cooperation and mutual assistance between the jurisdictions involved.
This may have been true for many years because the ability to secure international cooperation and mutual assistance was largely dependent on the
existence of bilateral agreements between jurisdictions. The legal framework for international cooperation and mutual assistance, however, is
much stronger now as several of the major international conventions for
combating international crime, which have been signed and ratified by a
very large number of countries, impose extensive legal obligations on their
States Parties to extend effective cooperation and mutual assistance to
other jurisdictions in law enforcement efforts to combat international
crimes. These conventions include the Vienna Convention, the Palermo
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Convention, the Terrorism Financing Convention and the Corruption
Convention.
C.

Conflicting Policies and Strategies Adopted by the United States to Fight
InternationalCrime

The overarching theme of this Symposium raises the implicit question
of whether the United States' responses to international crime have been
legally justified, appropriate or successful. Taking that cue, I will answer
the question in two parts. First, there is no question that the United States
has, at least over the last quarter century or so, played a strong leadership
role in the war against international crime. This has been clearly demonstrated by the initiatives taken by the United States towards the adoption
of numerous international treaties and standards to fight different international crimes such as drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, terrorism, corruption, torture, war crimes, crimes against humanity
and white slavery. Second, notwithstanding its substantial earlier contributions, the United States has, in recent years, made a number of decisions
and taken actions that have puzzled other States and seriously undermined its traditional leadership role in combating international crime.
This is particularly evident in the war on terrorism, where the politicization by the United States government of its policies and strategies in fighting terrorism has posed major impediments to winning this war and has
even jeopardized international efforts to fight other crimes. Rather than
focusing on concerted legal, diplomatic and economic measures, the
United States is seen to have arbitrarily and unilaterally used the military
instrument of war against two States-Afghanistan and Iraq-as its primary response and strategy to fight terrorism. It has been pointed out that
"the greatest concern is that the perceived need to act decisively has
190
pushed responses from a criminal law track to the path of war."
This politicization has alienated and confused the vast majority of
States in the world, including some of the country's traditional allies. As a
result, it cannot be said that there is a well-established international consensus to fighting international crime, including terrorism. This alienation and confusion has, in turn, reduced the political will of many of these
States, especially Muslim States, to cooperate fully or effectively with the
United States and other countries in fighting international crimes such as
terrorism.
The other major impediment to the United States' ability to effectively lead the war against international crime is its own demonstrated inconsistency in adherence to the rule of law and its treaty commitments.
Professor John Murphy sums up this problem aptly:
190. Jutta Brunee & Stephen J. Toope, The Use of Force: InternationalLaw After
Iraq, 53 IrNr'L & COMP. L.Q. 786, 789 (2004).
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The United States has had considerable difficulty in adhering to
the rule of law in its conduct of foreign affairs. However, there
have also been occasions when the United States has taken the
lead in supporting the rule of law in resolving some of the major
international issues. There has been, in other words, a substantial
degree of inconsistency in the U.S. record. 19'
Inconsistency by the United States in its adherence to the rule of law and
its international treaty commitments has placed it at great odds with the
majority of other States who view this country as using its status as the sole
superpower to act unilaterally and without feeling bound by the restraints
set by the applicable rules of international law. This posture robs the
United States of much of its political and moral credibility to lead and
influence other States to join it in fighting international crimes. Let me
provide a few concrete examples of how this perception of the United
States has arisen:
1.

The Invasion of Iraq as a Strategy to Fight Terrorism Was Not Legally
Justified, Appropriate or Generally Supported by the International
Community

In defending the invasion of Iraq in 2002, the United States government had used a variety of arguments, articulated at different times and by
different senior government officials, most notably President George W.
Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice. Between 2001 and 2003, these arguments have been
modified, qualified, explained differently and sometimes withdrawn
wholly or partly as new facts became known. The main arguments put
forward, however, included the following: (a) Iraq possessed weapons of
mass destruction, including biological and chemical weapons, that posed a
serious threat to the national security of the United States-particularly if
such weapons came into the hands of terrorists-and that the United
States therefore had a pre-emptive right of self-defence against a possible
future attack by Iraq; (b) the invasion was part of the overall strategy to
fight terrorism because Iraq was harbouring terrorists and was alleged to
have had some links to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks; (c) Iraq
had failed to comply with repeated United Nations Security Council resolutions to disarm and to submit to United Nations inspections, and the
United Nations sanctions had proved ineffective; (d) to effect regime
192
change (that is, to oust Saddam Hussein and his regime from power);
191. JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 349 (2004).

192. See Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance, CRS Report for Congress, (updated Oct. 22, 2004), available at http://

fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/38004.pdf
(providing background to
evolution of regime change policy under Bush administration, with particular refPublished by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005

47

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50: p. 583

and (e) to promote democracy and human rights for the long-oppressed
people of Iraq. To sum up, the overall justification for the invasion was
that it was a necessary and appropriate response to the continuing threats
posed to the national security of the United States flowing from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and, more specifically, a pre-emptive and
protective measure against the perceived threat of future terrorist acts by
193
Iraq against the United States.
After extensive inspections by the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the United States' own inspectors, no weapons of mass destruction were found. The most recent reports submitted by the inspection groups led by Charles Duelfer 1 94 and David Kay' 95 effectively
confirmed, in a great twist of irony, that Saddam Hussein had either destroyed his weapons of mass destruction or halted their production, which
indicates that the United Nations sanctions had actually worked. 19 6 The
any link between Iraq
bipartisan 9/11 Commission was also unable to19find
7
and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
The question that is raised is this: Was this military invasion legally
justified either as an appropriate response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks or as a protective measure against the possibility of future
terrorist attacks by Iraq? World opinion has clearly answered these questions in the negative. 198 The Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr.
Kofi Annan, has described the invasion as "illegal" because it contravened
the United Nations Charter, and it is not unreasonable to assume that his
views reflected the opinion of the majority of the member States of the
erences to Iraq); see also W. Michael Resiman, Why Regime Change Is (Almost Always)
a Bad Idea, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 517 (2004).
193. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council in N.Y. City, (Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news /releases/2003/02/20030205-1. html.
194. See Charles Duelfer, Dep't Cent. Intelligence, Comprehensive Report of the
Special Adviser to the DCI on Iraq's WMD 1 (Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://
www.cia.gov /cia/reports/iraqwmd_2004/index.htm (reporting results of search
for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq).
195. See Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on
Defense and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Oct. 2, 2003), available
at http://www.cia.gov/cia/ publicaffairs/speeches/2003/david kay_10022003.
html (noting reasons for difficulties in finding weapons of mass destruction).
196. See George A. Lopez & David Cortright, ContainingIraq: Sanctions Worked,
FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2004, at 90, 96 (2004) ("Once the ongoing monitoring
system was in place, sanctions continued to help force the regime to disarm.").
197. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 228-29.
198. See, e.g., Roger Cohen, The World: The War on Terror; An Obsession the World
Doesn't Share, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, § 4, at 6 ("Because America's central preoccupation-the war on terror-is not widely shared, it tends to isolate the United
States, as a country whose power is not so overwhelming as to invite dissent and
countervailing currents.").
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United Nations.19 9 Several leading international law and foreign policy
scholars have characterized this war as illegitimate and/or illegal. 20 0 More
199. Interview by BBC with Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, United Nations, in
New York, N.Y. (Sept. 16, 2004), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3661640.stm ("Q: So you don't think there was legal authority for the
war? A: I have stated clearly that it was not in conformity with the Security Council-with the UN Charter. Q: It was illegal? A: Yes, if you wish.").
200. See, e.g., Richard Falk, The Iraq War and the Future of InternationalLaw, 98
AM. Soc'v ITrr'L L. PROC. 263, 263 (2004) (asking, among other things, whether
Iraq war is legitimate and answering "no"); Thomas M. Franck, The Role of International Law and the UN After Iraq, 98 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 266, 266 (2004) (com-

paring United States to historic empires). "Washington seems determined to do
what all other empires did: lay down the rules by which everyone else, except it, is
expected to play." Id. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The End of Illegitimacy, 98 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 269, 269 (2004) (expressing her personal belief that Iraq war
is illegal); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Use of Force in Iraq: Illegal and Illegitimate, 98
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 262, 262 (2004) ("I conclude that the invasion was both

illegal and illegitimate."); see also Brunee & Toope, supra note 190; Jonathan I.
Charney, The Use of Force Against Terrorism and InternationalLaw, 95 AM. J. INT'L L.
835 (2001); Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM.J. INT'L
L. 839 (2001); Vaughan Lowe, The Iraq Crisis: What Now?, 52 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
859, 865 (2004) (stating that only legal basis for invasion is Kuwait "revival" and
dismissing this as not valid); Adam Roberts, Role of Law in the "War on Terror": A
Tragic Clash, 97 AM. Soc'v INr'L L. PROC. 18, 22 (2003) (contesting "legal" treatment of prisoner detainees); A. Mark Weisburd, The War in Iraq and the Dilemma of
Controlling the InternationalUse of Force, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 521, 522 (2004) (advancing two theses: United States attack on Iraq violated United Nations Charter and
Charter has fundamental flaws in addressing security concerns). In the United
Kingdom, sixteen international law professors signed a letter declaring that "there
is no justification under international law for the use of military force against Iraq"
because there were no grounds for a claim of self-defence and no authorization by
the United Nations Security Council. See Bernitz, et al., War Would Be Illegal,
GuARDrAN, Mar. 7, 2003, at 29 (stating belief before actual invasion was launched);
see also Robert W. Tucker & David C. Hendrickson, The Sources of American Legitimacy, FoPEIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 18, 27 (2004) (declaring "Washington had
acted illegally in going to war against Iraq," and that Bush doctrine supporting this
war was "severely wanting in all four of the elements that had sustained U.S. legitimacy in the past"). The four elements consist of the use of power in accordance
with international law, consensual modes of decision-making, moderation in policy
and preserving peace and prosperity within the community of advanced industrialized countries. But see Christopher Greenwood, InternationalLaw and the Pre-emptive
Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 7, 10 (2003)
(reasoning that key to peace is compliance with United Nations Charter); William
H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq and InternationalLaw, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 557, 557 (2003) ("The use of force preemptively is sometimes lawful and
sometimes not."); John Yoo, InternationalLaw and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
563, 571-74 (2003) (theorizing that anticipatory self-defence justified taking out
Saddam Hussein's regime). For an excellent and balanced discussion of United
States policy and practice with respect to the use of force including in Iraq and
Afghanistan, see MURPHY, supra note 191, at 142-206. Professor Murphy has expressed his view that "the policy arguments in favor of invading Iraq are much the
stronger [than those against the invasion], and would have fully supported the
Security Council authorizing the use of armed force against Iraq-in which case
there would have been no reasonable doubt about the legality of the invasion." Id.
at 173. My only comment on this argument is that the record of extensive deliberations on the Iraq situation in the Security Council gives no confidence that the
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recently, Mr. Annan asserted that this war, beyond being illegal, had not
reduced terrorism, which has continued unabated in several parts of the
world. This finding has been further confirmed by the most recent
United States State Department revised annual report on terrorism. 20 1 In-

deed, the 9/11 Commission report and the Kay and Duelfer reports have
further confirmed that, because the Iraqi borders were not properly sealed
by the United States' military soon after the invasion, a large'number of
foreign terrorists have entered Iraq and are fuelling the current insurgency. Paradoxically, therefore, the invasion of Iraq has increased terrorist activity in that country, which will not only be a threat to the security of
Iraq, but will also serve as a destabilizing force in the Middle East. The
original purported United States strategy of going into Iraq to stop terrorism has faced a serious setback-it has provided a new and much larger
sanctuary for terrorists, including terrorists from other countries who
slipped into Iraq before, during and after the invasion.
2.

The Torture, Mistreatment and Denial of Rights to PrisonersIs a Serious
20 2
Violation of International Conventions
When the United States embarked on its war with Iraq, it promised

the world that it would bring democracy, freedom and civilizing American
values to the country, replacing the repressive regime of Saddam Hussein,
which had been accused of torturing and killing the Kurds and his political opponents. Yet, it has been established that some elements of the
United States' military forces in Iraq have engaged in the torture of Iraqi
and other prisoners in their custody. The world has seen the shocking
photographs at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq of naked and blindfolded prisoners being hooked up to electric wires and threatened with attacks by
dogs as one of the methods of torture used by the United States military in
Council would have supported the invasion on the basis of such policy arguments
and this is also borne out by the United States' decision not to seek Security Council authorization prior to the invasion.
201. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, supra note 102. The original report, issued in April 2004, claimed that worldwide terrorism dropped by 45 percent between 2001 and 2003, that the number of acts committed in 2003 represents the
lowest annual total of international terrorist attacks since 1969 and that the statistics provided "clear evidence that we are prevailing in the fight." Id. The report
was found to contain several statistical errors, which were corrected when the report was reissued in June 2004. With the corrections, the original claim of a reduction in terrorism was not supportable. See Alan B. Krueger & David D. Laitin,
"Misunderestimating"Terrorism: The State Department's Big Mistake, FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 8, 9-10 (2004) (detailing statistical differences in studies).
202. See Silvia Borelli, The Treatment of TerroristSuspects Captured Abroad: Human

Rights and Humanitarian Law, in

ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAw NORMS AGAINST

39 (A. Bianchi ed., 2004) (providing excellent discussion of legal
aspects of this subject); Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions,
96 AM.J. INT'L L. 337, 338 (2002); Daryl A. Mundis, The Use of Military Commissions
to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96 Am. J. INT'L L. 320, 324 (2002).
Contra Ruth Wedgewood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J.
TERRORISM,

INT'L

L. 328, 330 (2002).
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the interrogation of their prisoners. Investigations conducted by the
United States Army of this scandal have resulted in a very detailed report
listing, describing and confirming many of these acts of torture and mistreatment. 20 3 Most recently, it has also been reported that the United
States military command was fully aware of these incidents of torture as
early as December 2003, more than a month before Army investigators
20 4
received the photographs from Abu Ghraib Prison.
First, the acts of torture violated the provisions of the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949, which sets out clear provisions calling for the humane treatment of prisoners of war. The United States government has
argued that the prisoners in question are unlawful enemy combatants and,
as such, are not entitled to the protections offered by the Geneva Convention, a position that has been criticized by several legal scholars. 20 5 Further, in August 2002, the Department of Justice provided a questionable
legal opinion in a memorandum prepared at the request of Alberto Gonzales, then Counsel to the President, stating that although certain interrogation acts "might constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment," they fail to rise to the level of torture under the Torture
Convention and the applicable implementing United States law. 20 6 In addition the memorandum stated in order to constitute torture, the acts
must be "extreme acts" and the severe pain must be "generally of the kind
difficult for the victim to endure." 20 7 It further stated that "where the
pain is physical, it must be of an intensity akin to that which accompanies
serious physical injury such as death or organ failure." 20 8 This opinion is
not consistent with the definition of torture contained in the Torture Convention, which defines torture as any act by which "severe pain or suffering," whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as interrogation or punishment. 20 9 Lawyers from the
203. See Report Submitted by Major General Antonio M. Taguba, Investigat-

ing Officer, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, (May 3,
2004), available at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison-abuse-report.pdf.
204. Josh White, U.S. Generals in Iraq Were Told of Abuse Early, Inquiry Finds,
WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2004, at Al (referring to investigation conducted by retired
Colonel Stuart A. Herrington).
205. Mr. Alberto Gonzales, then the White House Counsel and now Attorney
General, had also expressed the view that "the war against terrorism is a new kind
of war" and "this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on
questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions." Draft

of Memorandum for the President from Alberto R. Gonzales, (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www.msnbc.com/ modules/newsweek/pdf/gonzales memo.pdf.
206. Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re:
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A,
(signed by Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice), Aug. 1, 2002, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wpsov/nation/documents/dojinterrorgation memo20020801.pdf.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See Torture Convention, supra note 17, arts. 1-2 (defining torture). Article
1 defines torture as:
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United States State Department and the military have expressed reservations about the correctness of this legal opinion. It is most interesting to
note, however, that in December 2004, the Department of justice issued a
substantially revised memorandum which directly contradicted its August
2002 memorandum and now stated that torture need not rise to the level
of pain "equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical
injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even
death." 210 The memorandum concludes that the anti-torture law passed
by Congress equates torture with physical suffering "even if it does not
21
involve physical pain" but must still be more than "mild and transitory." 1
This revised memorandum was issued one week prior to the confirmation
hearings in the United States Senate for Mr. Gonzales on his nomination
2 12
to be Attorney General.
Numerous questions have also been raised about the mistreatment
and abuse of prisoners held at a United States military facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Civil liberties groups around the world-including the
American Civil Liberties Union, the International Red Cross, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch-and legal scholars have expressed
strong objections to the denial of due process to the prisoners held in
Guantanamo Bay. 21 3 Among the allegations of legal misconduct by the
United States authorities are continuing acts of torture, the denial of ac[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason

based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity ....
Id. art. 1.
210. See Memorandum from the U.S. Department of Justice for James B.
Comey, Deputy Attorney General (Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/ olc/dagmemo.pdf.
211. Id.
212. See Curt Anderson, U.S. Releases New Memo Defining Torture and New U.S.
Memo Says Torture Violates Law, ASSOCIATED PREss, Dec. 31, 2004, at 1.
213. SeeJohan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Blackhole, 53 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 1, 1-2 (2004) (describing ill-conceived legislation, excessive executive power
and judicial neglect as cause of human rights violations); see also Neil A. Lewis, Red
Cross FindsDetainee Abuse in Guanatanamo,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at Al (reporting on visit of International Committee of Red Cross to Guantanamo Bay covering
most of June 2004). The Red Cross charged in confidential reports to United
States government that American military has intentionally used psychological and
sometimes physical coercion "tantamount to torture" on prisoners at this prison
facility. Id. In addition, Federal Bureau of Investigation memoranda, recently obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union through a Freedom of Information
proceeding, revealed continuing abuse at the Guantanamo prison. See Carol D.
Long, Further Detainee Abuse Alleged, WASH. PosT, Dec. 26, 2004, at Al (detailing
abuse of prisoner detainees).
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cess to legal counsel, denial of access to families and the proposed trial of
terrorist suspects by military commissions.
Most recently, a number of courts in the United States and the United
Kingdom have issued decisions calling on the governments to accord certain minimum legal rights to these prisoners. 2 14 To date, only a fewjunior
level soldiers have been prosecuted for these crimes and no senior military
or civilian official has been prosecuted. The military commander of the
Abu Ghraib prison, however, was reassigned.
3.

The Failure to Closely Examine and Deal with the Root Causes of Terrorism
Will Make It Difficult to Win the War Against Terrorism

When I speak of the need for the United States and other countries to
understand and deal with the "root causes" of terrorism, I want to make it
absolutely clear that I am not in any way suggesting that there are any
legitimate grounds or justification for the commission of the horrendous
acts of terrorism on September 11, 2001. I believe that these terrorist attacks were a crime against humanity and the masterminds behind this
crime should be apprehended, prosecuted and punished. Having said
that, I still believe that it is critical for the United States and other countries to identify and help to eliminate the "root causes" or conditions that
explain or give rise to such terrorist behaviour.
We have heard the constant refrain that September 11, 2001 was an
attack on Western civilization, freedom and American values. This kind of
simplistic analysis or sweeping generalization is most regrettable and prevents us from understanding and addressing the underlying currents that
give rise to terrorism. As noted earlier, this line of thinking may have been
influenced by some scholars like Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis
who put forward their "clash of civilizations" theory. Such an unfortunate
characterization does great injustice to one of the world's great religions
and sows the seeds of distrust and intolerance towards the West in the
hearts of more than one billion law-abiding Muslims around the world.
As several American, European, Islamic and Middle Eastern scholars
have pointed out, the world needs to see and understand the "root causes"
that breed terrorists. Leading experts on terrorism such as Jessica Stern
and Philip Heymann have strongly recommended that such an analysis of
214. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004); Glen Frankel, British Court
Deals Blow to Terror Law, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2004, at A21 (reporting on House of
Lords ruling by eight to one on case brought by nine Muslim detainees that Government cannot detain suspected foreign terrorists indefinitely without trial).
In fact, the Human Rights Committee has declared expressly that a state
"may not depart from the requirement of effective judicial review of detention" and has affirmed that "the right to take proceedings before a
court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of the
detention must not be diminished by a State party's decision to derogate
from that Convention."

Jordan J. Paust, Detention,JudicialReview of Detention, and Due Process DuringProsecution, 97 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 13, 14 (2003).
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the "root causes" of terrorism is a critical prerequisite to finding a longterm solution to the problem. There are at least four root causes that have
been repeatedly identified in various statements issued by the terrorists.
The first root cause is the perceived American support for repressive regimes in the Middle East. Looking at the landscape of Middle East countries, many are authoritarian regimes under which citizens are denied
many basic human rights. It is a very telling statistic that fifteen of the
nineteen hijackers who carried out the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were from Saudi Arabia. Ordinary Arabs in these countries simply
do not understand why America, the leader of the free world and a great
champion of human rights that regularly lectures other countries on the
need to promote democracy and respect human rights, has maintained a
deafening silence on undemocratic, repressive regimes and human rights
violations in the Middle East.
Professor Amartya Sen has reminded us of the important link that
exists between freedom and development. The full enjoyment of political,
economic and social freedoms is a critical prerequisite for growth and development. Sen argues:
Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities
as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities
as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states. Despite
unprecedented increases in overall opulence, the contemporary
world denies elementary freedoms to vast numbers-perhaps
even the majority-of people .... In [some] cases, the violation
of freedom results directly from a denial of political and civil liberties by authoritarian regimes and from imposed restrictions on
the freedom to participate in the social, political and economic
215
life of the community.
The second root cause is the long-unresolved problem of Palestine.
This is a sore that has festered for too long in the region. Again, right or
wrong, Arabs (and indeed many developing countries and several developed countries) see the United States as either being on the side of Israel
or as not doing enough to support Palestinian aspirations. The continued
occupation of large sections of the West Bank and Gaza by Israeli troops,
tanks and Jewish settlements is a source of great frustration and pain to
the Palestinian people and the Arab world at large, including America's
strong allies, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.
The third root cause is the anger and fear that Arabs feel from globalization. For them, the symbols of globalization-free trade, the Internet,
Western pop culture, drugs, permissiveness and pornography-are eroding the core Islamic religious beliefs and values of their sons and daughters, and will gradually but surely destroy Islamic civilization, which they
215.

SEN,

supra note 157, at 3-4.
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fear is being marginalized. As noted earlier, Jessica Stern refers to those
2 16
feelings as alienation and humiliation.
The fourth root cause is a mix of religious and economic opposition
to the presence of American troops and armaments in the land of the Two
Holy Mosques-Saudi Arabia. First, many Muslims consider this a defilement of their sacred places of worship. Second, they see this foreign military presence as an economic stranglehold or control over their oil wealth.
They see this as a new form of economic colonialism or imperialism.
America's status as the sole superpower is also particularly worrisome to
them. This problem has been partly addressed by a reduction in United
States troops and armament levels in Saudi Arabia.
Both Arab/Islamic and Western scholars have suggested that some or
all of the above "root causes" have generated feelings of despair and helplessness among Muslims in the Middle East and driven many of them into
the arms of the religious fundamentalists and extremists. Finally, this
sense of frustration has exploded in acts of terrorism designed to capture
the world's attention to their plight and to seek a change of policy by the
West. This is certainly not an excuse for the terrorism but provides an explanation of it.2 17 Following this line of thinking, it has been suggested that
the primary target of the terrorist attacks was not the United States or its
people, but the repressive Arab regimes. The longer-term objective of
these terrorist attacks, it is argued, is to inflame the passions of ordinary
Muslims in these countries to rise up in a jihad or holy war and overthrow
those regimes, which would hopefully be replaced by new fundamentalist
Islamic regimes that would then set things right for the Muslim world.
This is borne out by the most recent statement issued by Osama bin Ladin,
where he openly calls on the Saudis to launch a rebellion against the royal
family.

218

Based on the above preliminary analysis, I believe that it is essential
that, in addition to adopting legal and security measures, the United
States and its coalition partners immediately address the underlying factors that tend to give rise to terrorism so as to create the foundation for
sound economic, political and social development in the Middle East and
other Asian countries like Indonesia and Pakistan. Unfortunately, there is
very little public discussion of, or interest in this approach, although it has
been considered and recommended in internal government analyses and
reports. One of the key recommendations of the 9/11 Commission,
under the heading "Preventing the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism," is the following:
216.

STERN,

supra note 101, at 9, 32.

217. See id.

218. The latest videotaped message was aired on October 29, 2004, timed just
before the United States presidential election and addressed to the American people. See Don Van Natta Jr., Sizing Up the New Toned-Down Bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2004, § 4, at 1; Craig Whitlock, From Bin Laden, Different Style, Same Message,
WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2004, at A20.
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The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to
Usama Bin Ladin's version of Islam are impervious to persuasion.
It is among the large majority of Arabs and Muslims that we must
encourage reform, freedom, democracy, and opportunity, even
though our own promotion of these messages is limited in its
effectiveness simply because we are its carriers. Muslims themselves will have to reflect upon such basic issues as the concept of
jihad, the position of women, and the place of non-Muslim minorities. The United States can promote moderation, but cannot
2 19
assure its ascendancy. Only Muslims can do this.
More specifically, the 9/11 Commission recommended:
A comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter terrorism should include economic policies that encourage development, more
open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives
of their families and to enhance prospects for their children's
future.220

In my opinion, the real war against terrorism must be a war of ideas, a
war to persuade Muslim societies in the Middle East, Asia and Africa to
rein in the radical and criminal fringe elements of their societies by offering them better political, economic and social opportunities so as to release them from their despair and sense of hopelessness.2 21 It has been
wisely observed that:
Although the actual "root causes" of terrorism are complex, repressive States, weak States, destitute States, and States in internal
chaos provided a potential breeding ground for the radicalization of discontent. Terrorist organizations can recruit effectively
22 2
in these settings.
At the same time, a separate effort needs to be launched to persuade
Muslims living in Europe and America to better integrate themselves into
their adopted societies without necessarily compromising their Muslim
identity, religion or culture. The strategy here must be to persuade them
to participate fully in the civic life of Western secular States and to live in
harmony with and tolerance towards their fellow-citizens who belong to
other faiths, thereby rejecting the radical view that Islam must be defined
in opposition to the West.223 Nicholas Sarkozy, until recendy the Finance
219. 9/l1 COMMISSION
tion 12.3).
220. 1d. at 379.
221. See also GILLES
287-95 (2004).

REPORT,

supranote 4, at 375-76 (stating Recommenda-

KEPEL, THE WAR FOR MUSLIM MINDS: ISLAM AND THE WEST

222. Brunee & Toope, supra note 190, at 786.
223. See TARIQ RAMADAN, WESTERN MUSLIMS AND THE FUTURE OF ISLAM 224-29
(2004). Ramadan is a Professor of Philosophy at the College of Geneva and Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. In 2000, Time
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Minister of France and now head of the French ruling party, the Union for
a Popular Movement, "has proposed allowing State funding for mosques
as a way of curbing foreign financing of them. ' 224 Although this proposal
runs counter to France's strict separation of Church and State, it was put
forward as a way to ease rising tensions in Europe's Muslim communities
225
and questions about past integration policies.
The war against terrorism can never be fought and won by a foreign
superpower like the United States, which has suffered a loss of moral and
political credibility in the Muslim world through its recent actions.
Surveys carried out by the Pew Research Center reveal that, one year after
the Iraq war, discontent with America and its policies had increased
rather than diminished in Europe and the Middle East and that in the
Middle East countries anger towards the United States remains pervasive. 226 Professor Philip Heymann has characterized the results of this survey as showing that "we are rapidly losing the support of our allies, and
that the reaction in the Muslim world to what we are doing is a disaster,"
and that "[w]e've been doing a terrible job" of maintaining support from
friendly nations in Europe and Asia and from governments where most of
the terrorists come from, the Middle Eastern countries and Southeast
Asia. 22 7 In the final analysis, the war against terrorism must be fought and
won by the Muslim States themselves rather than by a foreign superpower
wielding bombs and bayonets. The current quagmire in Iraq establishes
2 28
the wisdom of following this approach.
It seems to me that the United States, supported by its major allies in
Europe including France and Germany, should embark without further
delay in implementing strong diplomatic and economic initiatives to remove some of the underlying conditions that give rise to terrorism. It
seems to me that there are at least two specific areas that should be given
high priority.
Magazine named him one of the 100 most important innovators for the twenty-first
century. Yet, the United States government, in August 2004, revoked his visa and
work permit, thereby preventing him from taking up a teaching appointment at
the Univeristy of Notre Dame. See Paul Donnelly, The Ban on a Muslim Scholar,
WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2004, at A25 (comparing proclaimed and actual reasons for
revocation of his visa).
224. Keith A. Richburg, Sarkozy to Lead France'sRuling Party, WASH. POST, Nov.
29, 2004, at A16.
225. See id.
226. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, A Year After Iraq War
(Mar. 16, 2004), available at http://www.people-press.org/reports/display.php3?
ReportID=206 (summarizing findings of survey).
227. Interview by Michael Rodman with Philip Heymann Talking About Terror,
HARv. L. BULL., Fall 2004, at 19, 21.
228. See Brunee & Toope, supra note 190; Lowe, supra note 200; HEYMANN,
supra note 101, at 47-65; see also Madeleine K. Albright, Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster,
FOREIGN Arr., Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 2, 17-18 (2003) (emphasizing need for Middle
East countries to become more involved, especially in development of their economic and political systems).
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First, in the same way that the United States is arguing that freedom
and democracy are essential for Iraq, it should urge other Middle Eastern
governments to gradually introduce political and economic reforms, so as
to give their citizens a greater say and involvement in the political and
economic affairs of their countries. I emphasize "gradually" because any
quick transition, without adequate preparation of the basic conditions for
democracy to thrive, is likely to turn power in these countries to the radical fringe or fundamentalist religious elements. A gradual transition
would enable the citizens to be educated and suitably prepared to assume
their new responsibilities.
Second, the United States should lead the way for education reform
in Muslim countries. The September 11, 2001 investigations revealed that
among the principal breeding grounds for the new terrorists are the religious schools called madrassahs, which operate extensively in the Middle
East and countries like Pakistan and Indonesia. In Pakistan alone, it is
reported that there are about 39,000 madrassahs. These madrassahsadmit
young children who are taught under a curriculum that is exclusively or
primarily based on the Islamic religion. Some of these madrassahsunfortunately teach radical and violent versions of Islam and influence their students with negative impressions of the West and its culture, religions and
values. It would be extremely helpful if the students at these schools were
also taught math, science, world history, geography, literature and similar
subjects so that they could become more educated and enlightened citizens of their countries and thereby properly equipped to take up gainful
employment to support themselves and their families. This will not be an
easy task, particularly for the United States, which is strongly resented
now, or other foreign aid donors. The best approach, therefore, is for the
United States and its partners to work through the United Nations and its
specialized agencies, including the World Bank and the regional development banks, which should ensure that the leadership in such education
reforms is undertaken by indigenous institutions and non-governmental
groups to give them credibility and acceptance.
The lessons of history and my own instincts as a former international
development official with the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank
and the IMF have taught me that violence is often the expression of the
despair and helplessness that ordinary people in the developing world feel
when they suffer poverty, disenfranchisement and injustice; the expression
of the frustration and indignity they feel when their most basic human
rights are denied, rendering them voiceless and powerless in their own
societies; the humiliation and threat they sense when they see rich and
powerful developed countries trying to impose their Western values over
their religions and cultures in the name of globalization; and the homelessness they experience from decades of dispossession from their own
lands.
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In a true sense, this is the crisis of development that faces many parts
of the developing world. Mr. James Wolfensohn, the President of the
World Bank, aptly summed up the challenges ahead as follows:
The horrifying events of September 11th have made this a time
of reflection on how to make the world a better and safer place.
The international community has already acted strongly, by confronting terrorism directly and increasing security. But those actions by themselves are not enough. We will not create that
better and safer world with bombs or brigades alone. We will not
win the peace until we have the foresight, the courage, and the
229
political will to redefine the war.

To sum up, it is my view that we will not even begin to understand the
problem of terrorism or know how to defeat terrorism if we allow ourselves
to be caught up in the simplistic characterizations and misunderstandings
that mark the debate taking place in our media and other fora, and
thereby fail to understand the underlying factors that tend to give rise to
terrorism.
4.

United States' Gradual Retreat from Observance of InternationalLaw
Principles Seriously Hinders Its Ability to Exercise Leadership in
FightingInternational Crime

Since the present Administration took office in 2001, it has taken a
number of steps to withdraw or renege on the United States' previous international commitments under treaties that it had signed and promised
to observe. Three examples come to mind.
First, under the Clinton administration, the United States in 1997
23 0
signed the Rome Statute Establishing the International Criminal Court.
In May 2002, the United States government renounced its signature of this
treaty on the ground that it had a number of fundamental flaws, including
particularly that it exposed American officials and servicemen to the risk
of politicized prosecutions. Yet, 139 other States have signed the Statute,
among them most of the major allies of the United States-the United
Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium,
Austria, Denmark and Sweden.
Although it is appreciated that the United States, as a superpower, is
frequently involved in military operations abroad and exposed to somewhat greater risk than other countries, nevertheless the rationale given by
the government is not persuasive as the Statute contains several safeguards
for prosecution and the Court will be staffed by highly qualified and capable prosecutors and judges. The United States' objections have been described as "at best, exaggerated far out of proportion to any actual risks to
229. World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn, Speech at the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., (Mar. 6, 2002).
230. Rome Statute, supra note 10.
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be faced by United States personnel and, at worst, grounded in untenable
extrapolations of international law." 23 1 The position of the United States
is even more perplexing because it had itself called for the establishment
of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia and the experience to date of these tribunals is excellent.
Second, in July 2004, the United States government announced that it
would oppose provisions for inspections and verification of nuclear weapons and materials under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 2 32 It is altogether strange that the United States, which led the fight for inspections
and verification of Iraq's nuclear weapons and used Iraq's non-compliance
as a principal justification for the invasion of that country, now itself rejects inspection and verification provisions under the treaty. Given the
United States' objective of removing weapons of mass destruction wherever they may be found, it seems inconsistent for this government to adopt
this attitude of non-cooperation under a treaty it has promised to observe.
This position can only encourage other States like North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, India and Israel, which has one of the largest nuclear stockpiles, to
equally resist inspection and verification of their countries' nuclear weapons. Moreover, such a position by the United States will result in making it
easier for terrorists to obtain possession of nuclear weapons.
Third, many member States of the United Nations have accused the
United States of violating the fundamental provisions of the United Nations Charter by its unilateral invasion of Iraq under the doctrine of preemption, instead of respecting the clear Charter injunction that decisions
on such intervention should be based on the collective wisdom of the international community. It is unfortunate that the United States, which was
one of the founding fathers of the United Nations, ignored the provisions
of the Charter. Its proposed invasion of Iraq was never supported or authorized by the Security Council, which was still seised of the matter. As
events have now proven, the arguments put forward by the United States
of self-defence through pre-emption had no basis either in fact or law.
Other arguments for intervention, such as to effect a regime change in
Iraq, also have no legal basis in the Charter.

231. Thomas M. Franck & Stephen H. Yuhan, The United States and the International Criminal Court: Unilateralism Rampant, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 519, 519
(2003); see also Richard J. Goldstone, US Withdrawalfrom ICC Undermines Decades of
American Leadership in InternationalJustice, INT. CraM. CT. MONTHLY, June 2002 at 3,
11. Mr. Goldstone has served as a Justice of the Constitutional Court of South
Africa and as the Chief Prosecutor of the United Nations International Criminal
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
232. See Dafna Linzer, U.S. Shifts Stance on Nuclear Treaty: White House Resists
Inspection Provision,WASH. PosT, July 31, 2004 at Al ("For several years the United
States and other nations have pursued the treaty, which would ban new production
by any state of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons.... [T]he
Bush administration told other nations it still supported a treaty, but not
verification.").

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss3/5

60

Morais: Fighting International Crime and Its Financing: The Importance of
20051

FIGHTING INTERNATIONAL CRIME

643

Finally, as noted earlier, the failure of the United States to observe the
provisions of the Third Geneva Convention and the Torture Convention is
also very disturbing.
To sum up, all of the above actions by the United States government
in recent years have only served to convey to the other States in the world
that the United States is not serious about observing all of its international
treaty commitments and the basic principles of international law or that it
is selective about which commitments it will observe and which it will not.
With such an attitude, it is going to be very difficult and possibly impossible for the United States to exercise any effective leadership in the war
against international crime, particularly to persuade other States to honor
their international obligations to fight international crime.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The international legal framework to combat international crime, especially money laundering, the financing of terrorism and corruption, is
now well-established in terms of the development of most of the fundamental norms that should be followed by all countries, financial institutions and other affected persons. Although there is broad agreement in
principle to condemn terrorism and to take measures to fight it, there is
still no true international consensus on the definition of "terrorism" and
"terrorist organizations." In the absence of such consensus in clearly defining the enemy, it will be very difficult to produce a unified and coordinated international strategy to fight terrorism. More diplomatic efforts to
promote a greater consensus are clearly called for, and countries like the
United States and other developed countries need to address some of the
root causes that give rise to terrorism through economic and social programs designed to promote better understanding and tolerance between
nations. One such diplomatic effort might be to work steadily towards the
adoption of a comprehensive new international convention against terrorism. The other would be to initiate development programs that seek to
remove the root causes that foster terrorism and other international
crimes.
In outlining some of the impediments to the war against international
crime, my purpose is to suggest that much more work needs to be done to
improve the conditions for compliance. The challenges faced by governments, financial institutions, corporations and law enforcement officials in
fighting international crime are quite formidable. They need to be addressed in a systematic and coherent way if the war against international
crime is to be won. As has been noted earlier, the war against international crime is no longer the business of governments alone. It is everybody's business. It is particularly interesting to note that the evolution of
the norms towards fighting international crime has increasingly incorporated the active involvement of the private sector such as financial institutions, non-financial businesses and professions, non-profit organizations
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and "gatekeepers" that can be misused for the laundering of criminal proceeds or the financing of crimes such as terrorism. Thus, civil society has
been fully incorporated in this effort and the cooperation of all sectors of
this society is critical for the success of law enforcement efforts.
For many years, the United States has been a champion and leader in
fighting international crime such as drug trafficking, money laundering
and corruption. Nevertheless, some of its recent actions in fighting the
war on terrorism (including the financing of terrorism) have raised serious questions in the minds of many countries and even among many of its
own legal scholars about its commitment to the rule of law and respect for
the basic principles of international law. The United States cannot ask
other countries to respect the rule of law or to comply with the principles
of international law if it has itself failed to do so in a number of important
instances which have been discussed in this Article. If the United States is
to reclaim its role as leader in this war against international crime, as it
clearly should, and if this war is to be won, it must quickly restore the trust
and confidence that it had built up over the years throughout the world.
There is simply no better way to lead than by the sheer force of example.
The war against international crime is a very serious and dangerous
war. It is a war that must be won and won quickly. The costs of failure are
just too high.
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